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 Capital Punishment and Capital Murder: Market 
Share and the Deterrent Effects of the Death Penalty 
Jeffrey Fagan* 
Franklin E. Zimring** 
Amanda Geller*** 
I. Introduction 
A. The New Deterrence 
The modern debate on deterrence and capital punishment, now in its 
fourth decade, was launched by two closely timed events.  The first was the 
1976 United States Supreme Court decision in Gregg v. Georgia,1 which re-
stored capital punishment after its brief constitutional ban following Furman 
v. Georgia2 in 1972.3  In 1975, Professor Isaac Ehrlich published an influen-
tial article saying that during the 1950s and 1960s, each execution averted 
eight murders.4  Although Ehrlich’s article was a highly technical study pre-
pared for an audience of economists, its influence went well beyond the 
economics profession.  Ehrlich’s work was cited favorably in Gregg and later 
was cited in an amicus brief filed by the U.S. Solicitor General in Fowler v. 
North Carolina.5  No matter how carefully Ehrlich qualified his conclusions, 
his article had the popular and political appeal of a headline, a sound bite, 
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Open Society Institute.  Garth Davies provided invaluable help in data analysis.  Excellent research 
assistance was provided by David Finkelstein, Jason Stramaglia, and Richard Oberto.  Justin 
Wolfers, Brandon Garrett, and the participants at the Texas Law Review Punishment Law and 
Policy symposium provided helpful comments and advice.  Thanks to Eva DeLuna Castro at the 
Center for Public Policy Priorities for providing access to county data for Texas. 
 ** William Simon Professor of Law and Wolfen Distinguished Scholar, Boalt Hall, University 
of California at Berkeley. 
 *** Doctoral Candidate, School of Social Work, Columbia University. 
1. 428 U.S. 153 (1976). 
2. 408 U.S. 238 (1972). 
3. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 169. 
4. See Isaac Ehrlich, The Deterrent Effect of Capital Punishment: A Question of Life and Death, 
65 AM. ECON. REV. 397, 398 (1975); see also Isaac Ehrlich, Capital Punishment and Deterrence: 
Some Further Thoughts and Additional Evidence, 85 J. POL. ECON. 741 (1977) (continuing the 
examination of the deterrent effect of capital punishment using cross-sectional data from several 
states). 
5. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 35, Fowler v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 904 
(1976) (No. 73-7031). 
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and a bumper sticker all rolled into one: “every execution deters eight 
killings.” 
Reaction was immediate: Ehrlich’s findings were sharply disputed in 
academic forums such as the Yale Law Journal,6 launching an era of 
contentious arguments in the press and in professional journals.7  In 1978, an 
expert panel appointed by the National Academy of Sciences issued strong 
criticisms of Ehrlich’s work.8  Over the next two decades, economists and 
other social scientists attempted (mostly without success) to replicate 
Ehrlich’s results using different data, alternative statistical methods, and 
other design modifications that tried to address glaring errors in Ehrlich’s 
techniques and data.  The accumulated scientific evidence from the NAS 
report and these later studies weighed heavily against the claim that 
executions deter murders.9 
 
6. See David C. Baldus & James W.L. Cole, A Comparison of the Work of Thorsten Sellin and 
Isaac Ehrlich on the Deterrent Effect of Capital Punishment, 85 YALE L.J. 170, 171 (1975) (arguing 
that a statistical study cannot prove that executions deter murders); William J. Bowers & Glenn L. 
Pierce, The Illusion of Deterrence in Isaac Ehrlich’s Research on Capital Punishment, 85 YALE L.J. 
187, 205 (1975) (concluding that Ehrlich failed to provide any reliable evidence that the death 
penalty deters murder); Isaac Ehrlich, Deterrence: Evidence and Inference, 85 YALE L.J. 209, 209–
10 (1975) (arguing that certain critiques of his work have “selectively deleted observations, utilized 
an inferior regression specification, considered irrelevant variables and correlations, and revealed in 
the process misunderstanding of elementary statistical concepts”); Editors’ Introduction, Statistical 
Evidence on the Deterrent Effect of Capital Punishment, 85 YALE L.J. 164, 169 (1975) (discussing 
the debate surrounding statistical studies regarding deterrence effects of the death penalty and the 
inherent vulnerability of complex statistical techniques). 
7. There are numerous critiques of Ehrlich’s work.  See, e.g., Jeffrey Grogger, The Deterrent 
Effect of Capital Punishment: An Analysis of Daily Homicide Counts, 85 J. AM. STAT. ASS’N 295, 
295 (1990) (arguing that studies focusing on the relationship between homicide rates and 
executions, such as Ehrlich’s, tend to yield ambiguous results); Edward E. Leamer, Let’s Take the 
Con Out of Econometrics, 73 AM. ECON. REV. 31, 41–42 (1983) (criticizing the methodology used 
in analyzing the deterrent effect of capital punishment); Michael McAleer & Michael R. Veall, How 
Fragile Are Fragile Inferences? A Re-evaluation of the Deterrent Effect of Capital Punishment, 71 
REV. ECON. & STAT. 99, 102 (1989) (discussing Ehrlich’s data set); Walter S. McManus, Estimates 
of the Deterrent Effect of Capital Punishment: The Importance of the Researcher’s Prior Beliefs, 93 
J. POL. ECON. 417, 425 (1985) (concluding that researchers’ prior beliefs influence their 
conclusions). 
 Support and extensions of Ehrlich’s work exist as well.  See, e.g., George A. Chressanthis, 
Capital Punishment and the Deterrent Effect Revisited: Recent Time-Series Econometric Evidence, 
18 J. BEHAV. ECON. 81, 94 (1989) (upgrading Ehrlich’s initial controversial results); James Peery 
Cover & Paul D. Thistle, Time Series, Homicide, and the Deterrent Effect of Capital Punishment, 
54 S. ECON. J. 615, 621 (1988) (arguing that the deterrence effect cannot be analyzed properly 
without explicitly considering how the probabilities of punishment are defined); Stephen K. Layson, 
Homicide and Deterrence: A Reexamination of the United States Time-Series Evidence, 52 S. 
ECON. J. 68, 73–86 (1985) (updating Ehrlich’s work with new data sets). 
8. See Lawrence R. Klein et al., The Deterrent Effect of Capital Punishment: An Assessment of 
the Estimates, in DETERRENCE AND INCAPACITATION: ESTIMATING THE EFFECTS OF CRIMINAL 
SANCTIONS ON CRIME RATES 336, 336–60 (Alfred Blumstein et al. eds., 1978). 
9. See William C. Bailey, Deterrence, Brutalization, and the Death Penalty: Another 
Examination of Oklahoma’s Return to Capital Punishment, 36 CRIMINOLOGY 711, 729–32 (1998) 
(concluding that media coverage of executions has no significant deterrent effect on homicide); Jon 
Sorensen et al., Capital Punishment and Deterrence: Examining the Effect of Executions on Murder 
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The debate both revived and shifted within the past decade.  Since 1996, 
more than a dozen studies have been published claiming that each execution 
can prevent anywhere from three to thirty-two homicides.10  The new deter-
rence studies analyze data that span a twenty-year period since the 
resumption of executions following the United States Supreme Court’s deci-
sions in Furman11 and Gregg.12  The claims of these new studies are far 
bolder than the original wave of studies by Professor Ehrlich and his 
students.13  Some claim that pardons, commutations, and exonerations cause 
murders to increase.14  One says that even murders of passion, among the 
most irrational of lethal acts, can be deterred.15  In short, these studies 
suggest that the deterrent effects of capital punishment apparently are 
 
in Texas, 45 CRIME & DELINQ. 481, 481–91 (1999) (finding no evidence of deterrence resulting 
from capital punishment using Texas execution and murder rate data from 1984 through 1997). 
10.  See Appendix A for a list of recent studies that claim deterrent effects from execution in 
the post-Gregg era.  Three papers contest the claim that capital punishment deters murder.  
Lawrence Katz and his colleagues report no significant deterrent effects of executions on murder 
rates after controlling for prison conditions and other indicia of the overall performance of the 
criminal justice system.  See Lawrence Katz et al., Prison Conditions, Capital Punishment, and 
Deterrence, 5 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 318, 339–40 (2003).  John Donohue and Justin Wolfers 
examined evidence of deterrent effects and found that “the existing evidence for deterrence is 
surprisingly fragile.”  John J. Donohue & Justin Wolfers, Uses and Abuses of Empirical Evidence in 
the Death Penalty Debate, 58 STAN. L. REV. 791, 794 (2005).  Jon Sorensen and his colleagues 
report no counter-deterrent effects on murder from a moratorium on capital punishment in Texas, 
once a rich set of control variables on the causes and correlates of murder was included in the 
analysis.  See Jon Sorensen et al., supra note 9, at 481–91; see also JON SORENSEN & ROCKY 
LEANN PILGRIM, LETHAL INJECTION: CAPITAL PUNISHMENT IN TEXAS DURING THE MODERN ERA 
39–47 (2006) (re-analyzing Cloninger and Marchesini’s claim that the moratorium resulted in an 
increase in homicides); Dale O. Cloninger & Roberto Marchesini, Execution and Deterrence: A 
Quasi-Controlled Group Experiment, 33 APPLIED ECON. 569 (2001). 
11. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972). 
12. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976). 
13. Joanna Shepherd, an author of several studies finding a deterrent effect, has recently argued 
before Congress that recent research has created a “strong consensus among economists that capital 
punishment deters crime,” going so far as to claim that “[t]he studies are unanimous.”  Terrorist 
Penalties Enhancement Act of 2003: Hearing on H.R. 2934 Before the Subcomm. on Crime, 
Terrorism, and Homeland Security of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 108th Cong. 10–11 
(2004) (statement of Joanna M. Shepherd) [hereinafter Hearing], available at 
http://judiciary.house.gov/media/pdfs/printers/108th/93224.pdf. These conclusions were repeated 
verbatim in recent testimony by Professor Paul Rubin, co-author on several recent studies also 
reporting deterrent effects from executions.  An Examination of the Death Penalty in the United 
States: Hearing before the Senate Subcomm. on the Constitution, Civil Rights, and Property Rights 
of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 108th Cong. (2006) (statement of Paul H. Rubin), available 
at http://judiciary.senate.gov/testimony.cfm?id=1745&wit_id=4991. 
14. See, e.g., H. Naci Mocan & R. Kaj Gittings, Getting Off Death Row: Commuted Sentences 
and the Deterrent Effect of Capital Punishment, 46 J.L. & ECON. 453, 474 (2003) (finding that 
“[e]ach additional execution decreases homicides by about five, and each additional commutation 
increases homicides by the same amount, while one additional removal from death row generates 
one additional homicide”). 
15. Joanna M. Shepherd, Murders of Passion, Execution Delays, and the Deterrence of Capital 
Punishment, 33 J. LEGAL STUD. 283, 318 (2004). 
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limitless, leading some proponents to offer execution as a cure-all both for 
murder and several other types of crime.16 
Both legal scholars and social scientists have transformed this new 
social science evidence into calls for more executions that they claim will 
save lives,17 and new rules that will remove procedural roadblocks and hasten 
executions.18  Others challenge the scientific credibility of these new 
studies,19 and warn about the moral hazards and practical risks of capital 
punishment.20 
Obviously, the stakes are high in this latest round of the recurring 
debate on deterrence.  We think the new results are wrong, for a simple 
reason.  The measures of homicide used in the new deterrence studies are 
overly broad: by studying whether punishments affect all homicides, these 
studies fail to identify a more plausible target of deterrence—namely, those 
homicides that are punishable by death.  By broadening the target of the 
search for deterrent effects, these studies have overestimated not just the 
number of lives saved by deterrence, but whether any murders are averted by 
the threat of execution.21  In this study, we find no evidence of deterrence 
when the effects of execution are estimated for the subset of homicides that 
are most directly affected by execution. 
 
16. Zhiqiang Liu, Capital Punishment and the Deterrence Hypothesis: Some New Insights and 
Empirical Evidence, 30 E. ECON. J. 237, 254 (2004). 
17. Cass R. Sunstein & Adrian Vermeule, Is Capital Punishment Morally Required? Acts, 
Omissions, and Life–Life Tradeoffs, 58 STAN. L. REV. 703, 748–50 (2005); see also Posting of Gary 
Becker to the Becker–Posner Blog, http://www.becker-posner-blog.com/archives/2005/12/ (Dec. 
18, 2005, 06:02 PM) (citing the deterrence argument as more than convincing to support capital 
punishment); Posting of Richard Posner to the Becker–Posner Blog, http://www.becker-posner-
blog.com/archives/2005/12/ (Dec. 18, 2005, 07:53 PM) (synthesizing arguments based on recent 
research into the powerful deterrent effect of the death penalty and noting that such values outweigh 
factors opposing capital punishment). 
18. See, e.g., Streamlined Procedures Act of 2005, S. 1088, 109th Cong. (2005); Criminal Alien 
Deportation Improvements Act of 1995, H.R. 668, 104th Cong. (1995). 
19. Donohue & Wolfers, supra note 10, at 794 (2005) (reviewing the main study cited by 
Sunstein and Vermeule and finding that the evidence supporting deterrence is surprisingly tenuous); 
see also Richard Berk, New Claims About Executions and General Deterrence: Déjà Vu All Over 
Again?, 2 J. EMPIRICAL L. STUD. 303, 304 (2005) (contending that much empirical research is 
necessarily based on observational data and that there are therefore “a host of problems in trying to 
make credible causal inferences”); Jeffrey Fagan, Death and Deterrence Redux: Science, Law and 
Causal Reasoning on Capital Punishment, 4 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. (forthcoming 2007). 
20. Carol S. Steiker, The Ethics and Empirics of Capital Punishment: No, Capital Punishment 
Is Not Morally Required: Deterrence, Deontology, and the Death Penalty, 58 STAN. L. REV. 751, 
789 (2005) (responding to the claim of the “moral requirement” of Sunstein and Vermeule by 
stating that “neither those who have categorical moral objections to the death penalty nor even those 
who fully embrace consequentialism should be willing to make” the life–life tradeoff “that on closer 
inspection reveals itself as the most Faustian of bargains”). 
21. Others find the results too unstable to be deemed reliable.  See, e.g., Berk, supra note 19, at 
328 (noting that the study data regarding deterrence is “highly skewed,” with only small portions of 
the data influencing the final results); Donohue & Wolfers, supra note 10, at 794 (finding that the 
evidence supporting deterrence “cannot be reliably disentangled from the year-to-year changes in 
the homicide rate”). 
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B. Errors in Aggregation 
The question of whether the threat or actuality of execution adds to the 
deterrent effect on homicide produced by lengthy imprisonment alone has 
been the subject of statistical debate for more than a century.22  The vast 
majority of statistical studies that try to address this issue have used a variety 
of punishment variables as independent variables (whether the death penalty 
is authorized, or used, or its frequency) and the total rate of intentional 
homicides23 as the dependent variable.24 
The use of total intentional homicide has always been an aggregation 
error in the deterrence debate in the United States.25  Under common law, 
only the top grade of murder was ever eligible for the death penalty, but the 
traditional legal framework of the criteria that made criminal homicide po-
tentially capital was far from clear until the United States Supreme Court 
imposed minimum constitutional standards for death eligibility in Gregg v. 
Georgia26 and its companion 1976 cases.27  The Supreme Court required the 
specific definition of murders that are death-eligible and the states responded 
with a series of death eligibility standards (usually drawn from section 210.6 
of the Model Penal Code).28 
 
22. Ehrlich, supra note 4, at 397 (noting that debates over the “justness and efficacy of capital 
punishment” have involved some kind of statistical analysis from the time of Beccaria in the 
eighteenth century). 
23. These studies most commonly compute the total rate of intentional homicides by using the 
counts of murders and non-negligent homicides supplied by either local law enforcement agencies 
or by the Department of Justice through the FBI’s Uniform Crime Reporting Program.  See, e.g., 
Liu, supra note 16, at 244 (employing intentional homicide data supplied by the Department of 
Justice, which compiles Uniform Crime Reports with the information provided by local law 
enforcement agencies); Shepherd, supra note 15, at 304 (same).  For an assessment of the 
Department of Justice data, see MICHAEL D. MALTZ, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, BRIDGING 
GAPS IN POLICE CRIME DATA 1 (1999), available at 
http://www.ojb.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/bgpcd.pdf. 
24. See Hearing, supra note 13, at 12 (noting that modern studies of the deterrent effect of 
capital punishment have used multivariate regression analysis, which separates the effects of 
different factors on a set number of murders). 
25. See THORSTEN SELLIN, THE DEATH PENALTY: A REPORT FOR THE MODEL PENAL CODE 
PROJECT OF THE AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE 52–59 (1959) (testing execution effects by counting 
separately particularly high-risk categories of homicides, such as killings of police officers and 
prison guards). 
26. 428 U.S. 153 (1976). 
27. Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325 (1976); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 
(1976); Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976); Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976). 
28. Under Gregg and its companion cases, this definition can occur in one of two ways.  A state 
may either narrowly define a class of death-eligible murders for a jury finding during the guilt–
innocence phase of trial or a state may broadly define a class of death-eligible murders and provide 
for the narrowing of the class by jury findings of aggravating factors during the sentencing phase of 
trial.  See Jurek, 428 U.S. at 276–77 (approving the Texas statute that embodies the narrow 
definition alternative); Gregg, 428 U.S. at 206–07 (approving the Georgia statute that embodies the 
broad definition alternative).  For examples of the state statutes that were at issue at the time of 
Gregg, see GA. CODE ANN. § 27-2534.1 (Supp. 1974); TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 37.071 
(Vernon Supp. 1974–1975); and FLA. STAT. § 921.141 (1973 & Supp. 1975).  The modern version 
of the Georgia statute is codified at GA. CODE ANN. §§ 16-5-1, 17-10-30, 17-10-31, 17-10-35 
1808 Texas Law Review [Vol. 84:1803 
 
Yet most of the new deterrence studies have estimated the effects of 
executions on total homicides.  This makes little sense, either 
jurisprudentially or as a matter of behavioral science.  Since Gregg, the 
statutory description of death-eligible murders has been a constitutional re-
quirement for state and federal criminal codes.  State statutes recognize that 
there are grades of willfulness or premeditation, and these will impact the 
likelihood of a homicide resulting in the death penalty.29  Similarly, there are 
some homicides—such as killings of police or children—that evoke strong 
normative responses from legislatures which in turn are expressed in 
particular sections of capital statutes creating eligibility for the death penalty 
for such crimes.30  Jurisprudentially, the idea that “death is different” has 
guided states to craft death penalty statutes that reserve execution for offend-
ers who not only meet capital eligibility requirements but whose culpability 
rises to a threshold that matches the severity of a death sentence.31 
Social science research on homicide also has distinguished among types 
of murders and murderers.32  These studies suggest that the capacity for 
 
(2005).  The modern version of the Texas and Florida statutes can be found at the same citations as 
above. 
29. Hans Zeisel, The Deterrent Effect of the Death Penalty: Facts v. Faith, 1976 SUP. CT. REV. 
317, 326. 
30. For example, several states include killings of children below statutorily defined ages as an 
aggravating circumstance that creates eligibility for capital punishment.  See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. 
ANN. § 13-703(F)(9) (2001); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/9-1(b)(7) (2002); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. 
§ 14:30(A)(5) (1997); NEV. REV. STAT. § 200.033(10) (2005); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2903.01(C) 
(West 1997); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 9711(d)(16) (1998); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-31(12) (2004). 
31. Jeffrey Abramson, Death-is-Different Jurisprudence and the Role of the Capital Jury, 2 
OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 117 passim (2004); see, e.g., Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 605–06 (2002) 
(“[T]here is no doubt that ‘[d]eath is different.’”) (alteration in original); id. at 614 (Breyer, J., 
concurring in the judgment) (“[T]he Eighth Amendment requires States to apply special procedural 
safeguards when they seek the death penalty.”); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 337 (2002) 
(Scalia, J., dissenting) (suggesting that the majority opinion holding it cruel and unusual to punish 
persons with mental retardation with death is the “pinnacle of . . . death-is-different jurisprudence”); 
McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 340 (1987) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“It hardly needs 
reiteration that this Court has consistently acknowledged the uniqueness of the punishment of 
death.”); Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 463 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citing “previously 
unquestioned principle” that unique safeguards are necessary because death penalty is “qualitatively 
different”); Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447, 459 (1984) (citing the Court’s prior recognition of 
the “qualitative difference of the death penalty”) (citation omitted); id. at 468 (Stevens, J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“[T]he death penalty is qualitatively different . . . and 
hence must be accompanied by unique safeguards . . . .”); Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604 
(1978) (holding death to be “qualitatively different”); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 
305 (1976) (joint opinion of Stewart, Powell, & Stevens, JJ.) (“[T]he penalty of death is 
qualitatively different from a sentence of imprisonment, however long.”); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 
U.S. 153, 188 (1976) (joint opinion of Stewart, Powell, & Stevens, JJ.) (“[T]he penalty of death is 
different in kind from any other punishment . . . .”); Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 286–89 
(1972) (Brennan, J., concurring) (“Death is a unique punishment . . . .”); id. at 306 (Stewart, J., 
concurring) (“The penalty of death differs from all other forms of criminal punishment, not in 
degree but in kind.”). 
32. See, e.g., JACK KATZ, THE SEDUCTIONS OF CRIME 32–34 (1988) (differentiating homicides 
based on motivations for their commission); JAMES O’KANE, WICKED DEEDS: MURDER IN 
AMERICA 19–34 (2005) (examining and explaining the differences between homicide, murder, and 
2006] Capital Punishment and Capital Murder 1809 
 
rational action among offenders often is doubtful, as they are prone to 
hyperdiscounting of risk and inflation of the immediate value of their 
actions.33  Accordingly, to lump all homicides into a singular category that 
assumes that all murders are equally deterrable runs afoul of both law and 
facts. 
Despite these legal boundaries on which homicides are death-eligible, 
nearly all studies have examined the effects of capital punishment on total 
homicides.  Only three studies have examined the effects of execution on an 
index of murders that are eligible for the death penalty, and none have identi-
fied a deterrent effect on capital murders.  Professor Robert H. Dann 
examined capital homicides—those eligible for the death penalty—in 
Philadelphia in the sixty days before and after each of five highly publicized 
executions that took place between 1929 and 1932.34  He found no evidence 
of a change in capital homicide rates, nor in other homicide rates.  Professor 
Leonard Savitz replicated Dann’s research design for the period 1944–1947, 
examining capital-eligible homicides in the eight weeks before and after four 
highly publicized death sentences.35  Like Dann, Savitz found no evidence of 
deterrence.36 
More recently, Professors Ruth Peterson and William Bailey analyzed 
the effects of executions on rates of “felony murder,” defined as killings 
committed in the course of six specific felony crimes: rape, robbery, 
burglary, larceny, vehicle theft, and arson.37  They added another composite 
category that included murders committed in the course of nonfelony crimes 
including prostitution, narcotics violations, gambling, and a wide range of 
other felonies.38  Using time-series analyses, they found no deterrent effects 
of executions on felony murders.39  This was an improvement over earlier 
tests that lumped together capital and other homicides.  After all, felony 
murder carries strict liability, a consequence of the intent-based retributivism 
that guides most of the capital murder statutes in effect in thirty-eight states 
 
manslaughter); KENNETH POLK, WHEN MEN KILL: SCENARIOS OF MASCULINE VIOLENCE 175–84 
(1994) (distinguishing homicides based on relationships between victim and offender); MARVIN 
WOLFGANG, PATTERNS IN CRIMINAL HOMICIDE 20–27 (1958) (same). 
33. See, e.g, Francisco Parisi & Vernon Smith, Introduction to THE LAW AND ECONOMICS OF 
IRRATIONAL BEHAVIOR 1, 1–2 (Francisco Parisi & Vernon Smith eds., 2005) (arguing that doubts 
over human rationality arise from people’s varying degrees of “skills, endowments, and a variety of 
psychological and physical constraints”); see also infra notes 159–160 and accompanying text. 
34. Robert H. Dann, The Deterrent Effect of Capital Punishment, FRIENDS’ SOC. SERVICE 
SERIES , Mar. 1935, at 3, 5–6. 
35. Leonard D. Savitz, A Study of Capital Punishment, 49 J. CRIM. L. CRIMINOLOGY & POL. 
SCI. 338, 340 (1958). 
36. Id. at 341. 
37. Ruth D. Peterson & William C. Bailey, Felony Murder and Capital Punishment: An 
Examination of the Deterrence Question, 29 CRIMINOLOGY 367, 372 (1991). 
38. Id. 
39. Id. at 379–80. 
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today.40  However, this narrowing exercise produced no evidence of a deter-
rent effect, using homicide data from 1976 to 1987. 
The most recent effort to disaggregate homicides was published by 
Professor Joanna Shepherd,41 who used information about homicide 
circumstances and situations that is provided in police descriptions of 
homicides and made available through a public-use data archive.42  Shepherd 
reported that executions deter all types of murder, including “crimes of 
passion” that so often are considered to be irrational and spontaneous acts 
that are beyond the rational reach of execution threats.43  However, 
Shepherd’s partitioning of the data was not indexed to statute, but to a set of 
categories descriptive of “different types of murders”44 that were defined nei-
ther by statute nor, with the exception of “crimes of passion,” by theory.  
More important, none of these categories was narrowed according to statu-
tory criteria that bound the circumstances and conditions that qualify a 
murder as “capital.”45 
With this one exception, the majority of the current portfolio of 
deterrence studies, conducted principally by economists, have ignored these 
limited attempts to isolate the effects of capital punishment on the crimes to 
which it is targeted, and instead assume that the threat of execution will deter 
all manner of homicides.  In this Article, we set out to correct this error. 
C. The Research Enterprise 
We shift the argument on deterrence by focusing not on general 
homicide trends and rates, but on the subset of homicides that have been 
defined as eligible for the death penalty by statute.  These types of homicides 
should provide a more sensitive indicator than the overall homicide rate in-
dex for detecting a deterrent effect from execution.46  We use the public-use 
 
40. Kevin Cole, Killings During Crimes: Toward a Discriminating Theory of Strict Liability, 28 
AM. CRIM. L. REV. 73, 74–75 & n.6 (1990). 
41. Shepherd, supra note 15, at 285. 
42. Id.  Information about the circumstances of events is provided by the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation in the Supplementary Homicide Reports, a data file of homicide records that includes 
information on victims, offenders (where known via arrest), and the circumstances of the homicide 
event.  See MALTZ, supra note 23, at 31–39; see also infra note 71. 
43. Shepherd, supra note 15, at 308. 
44. Id. at 292 (discussing murders of intimates, acquaintances, and strangers, as well as crime-
of-passion murders, murders committed during felonies, and murders of African Americans and 
whites). 
45. Id.  For a discussion of the aggravating and mitigating factors that a jury takes into account 
in the penalty phase of a capital murder case, see 40A AM. JUR. 2D HOMICIDE § 551 (1999). 
46. See, e.g., Franklin Zimring & Gordon Hawkins, Deterrence and Marginal Groups, 5 J. RES. 
CRIME & DELINQ. 100, 100–05 (1968) (advocating “marginal group” analysis, which aims to 
identify the persons whom deterrent measures are thought to control and to provide a more precise 
account of the deterrent effect of criminal laws).  Some might consider this distinction nothing more 
than an “acoustic separation” that has little meaning in the reality of homicide commission.  But as 
we show later on, the breadth and heterogeneity of homicide make this distinction meaningful.  
Moreover, one might argue that if there is no special deterrent effect for “capital homicides,” then 
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data archive based on police descriptions of homicides from 1976–2003 to 
construct rates of potentially death-eligible killings.  While death-eligible 
cases are a much larger fraction of total homicides than cases that produce 
death sentences, the types of killing that are eligible for the capital sanction 
are less than 25% of total criminal homicides, as will be seen in Table 1 and 
Figure 1. 
Once potentially capital killings have been isolated, our research 
strategy is to probe for distinctive movements in death-eligible killings in 
death penalty states to show whether the prospect of execution is influencing 
homicide, rather than the many other factors that vary over time to produce 
fluctuations in homicide rates.  The study uses the variation in nondeath-
eligible killings as a natural control for temporal influences.  We hypothesize 
that variations in the administration of the death penalty should produce 
increases and decreases in death-eligible killings that are distinct from 
changes in nondeath-eligible killings—such specific patterns are the 
distinctive fingerprint of the death penalty effect. 
This strategy was first used in a study of “three strikes and you’re out” 
laws which greatly increased the penalties for two classes of persons with 
prior records who had previously been responsible for about one-eighth of 
California felony arrests.47  The test of deterrent impact in that study was to 
see if the proportionate share of persons in the two special penalty categories 
declined after the effective date of the new legislation.48  The study found 
that the proportion of defendants eligible for third strikes in the post-law ar-
rest pool declined 19% (indicating marginal deterrence) but that the 
proportion of second strike eligible defendants did not change (indicating no 
additional deterrence for this group).49 
In the current study, any increase in execution risk should reduce the 
proportion of killings that are potentially death-eligible if it is the change in 
death risk that is operating net of other factors that may be influencing rates 
of both capital-eligible and other homicides.  It is only for capital-eligible 
 
the threat of death could just as easily affect not only homicide but all nonlethal crimes.  We 
constrain the analysis to the types of homicides most likely to produce death-eligible cases by 
controlling for robberies, the paradigm of a felony murder.  See infra note 56 and accompanying 
text. We also conduct robustness tests by estimating the effects of death sentences and executions 
on felony murders, those murders committed during the course of commission of another homicide.  
See infra Part IV. 
47. FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING ET AL., PUNISHMENT AND DEMOCRACY: THREE STRIKES AND 
YOU’RE OUT IN CALIFORNIA 85 (2001) [hereinafter ZIMRING ET AL., THREE STRIKES]; see also 
FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING ET AL., CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN CALIFORNIA: THE IMPACT OF THREE 
STRIKES AND YOU’RE OUT 1–2 (2001) [hereinafter ZIMRING ET AL., IMPACT OF THREE STRIKES]. 
48. ZIMRING ET AL., THREE STRIKES, supra note 47, at 85. 
49. See id. at 98 (noting that the proportion of third strike offenders dropped from 4.3% to 3.5% 
after the passage of the law while there was no significant change in the proportion of second strike 
offenders for the same time period). 
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killings that the threat has any reality.50  If the risk of execution goes down, 
then the proportion of death-eligible killings in death penalty states should 
increase because the force of the death threat has weakened.  The shorthand 
method for measuring these specific effects is to determine the “market 
share” of cases that would be death-eligible both over time and between 
states at various time points. 
There are three different “market share” comparisons that test 
deterrence.  In death penalty states, the market share of death-eligible cases 
should go down when execution risk increases and should go up when exe-
cution risk decreases.  Cross-sectionally, the market share of death-eligible 
cases should be larger in states without a death penalty (no marginal deter-
rent of capital threat) than in states with a death penalty.  And as execution 
risk increases, the market share of death-eligible cases should shrink in death 
penalty states but not in states without the death penalty.  In sum, the com-
parison of death-eligible versus non-eligible homicides becomes the 
preferred method of choosing between execution effects and other temporal 
factors. 
We begin with an analysis of the market share of capital homicides in 
the context of homicide trends from 1976 to 2003 in all death penalty states 
and compare patterns in those states with nondeath penalty jurisdictions.  
Then, we add a detailed analysis of trends in the state of Texas and in 
Houston, its largest city.  We place special emphasis on Texas (and Houston) 
for two reasons.  That state and that city have been the dominant users of 
executions in the modern era, with Texas accounting for more than one-third 
of all executions in the first quarter century after executions resumed 
(through 2006).51  The second reason for a special Texas focus is that recent 
 
50. See Shepherd, supra note 15, at 292.  Shepherd maintains that executions deter all types of 
murder by allowing all would-be murderers to update their expectations of punishment risk, 
compensating for the uncertainty about whether the murder they are about to commit would be 
charged and prosecuted capitally.  Id.  Such uncertainty, she claims, has less to do with the putative 
murder than with exogenous factors such as prosecutorial discretion, quality of defense counsel, and 
juror preferences.  Id.  These assumptions of cognition, risk analysis, cost measuring, and 
premeditation in homicide are rarely observed in research on murder and murderers, except perhaps 
among the very small percentage of murder-for-hire and premeditated killings.  See Gregg v. 
Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 186 (1976) (“There are carefully contemplated murders, such as murder for 
hire, where the possible penalty of death may well enter into the cold calculus that precedes the 
decision to act.”).  Rather, murderers are more likely to discount punishment risks and inflate the 
present value of whatever gains the crime may offer.  See Yair Listokin, Efficient Time Bars: A New 
Rationale for the Existence of Statutes of Limitations in Criminal Law, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. 99, 100 
(2002) (noting as “commonly accepted within . . . criminology” the view that “criminals discount 
the future at a higher rate than society”).  Recognizing this, state legislatures have historically 
enacted murder laws that focus on intent as a metric to identify and isolate a set of murders for the 
most serious punishments available in that state.  See Cole, supra note 40, at 74 (stating that a 
killing will be classified as a criminal homicide only if the killer possessed a certain mental state). 
51. Death Penalty Info. Ctr., Executions in the United States, 1608–1976, By State, 
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/article.php?scid=8&did=1110.  The Death Penalty Information 
Center’s website displays a number of statistical tables about the death penalty, which are 
periodically updated to take account of new death sentences, executions, and exonerations.  This 
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social science analysis of general homicide patterns has shown that the 
evidence of execution impact on total homicide can be dismissed for U.S. 
death states other than Texas.52  Indeed, much of the deterrent effect ob-
served in the new deterrence studies is leveraged by the influence of Texas, 
and within Texas, the effects are concentrated in and leveraged by the pat-
terns in Harris County.53  If executions show a distinctive impact on death-
eligible killings anywhere, Texas should be the place.  Given the high rate of 
executions in Texas, the case for the impact of the death penalty on capital-
eligible homicide over time cannot be so easily dismissed for Texas. 
Finally, we use panel data methods to estimate a series of regression 
models to identify the effects of capital punishment on the rate of capital-
eligible homicides.  We adjust the estimates for the level of noncapital 
homicides in each state over time to control for variations from state to state 
in the base rates of homicide.  This strategy allows us to estimate whether the 
changes in the noncapital homicide rate are simultaneously influencing the 
rate of capital homicides.  We include two measures of capital punishment: 
the existence of a death penalty statute in each state for each year in the panel 
and then the number of death sentences and executions that took place in the 
state in the preceding year and the preceding two years.  We scale both the 
number of capital-eligible homicides and other homicides to each state’s 
population to ensure that any deterrent effects from execution are weighted 
proportionately to the state’s population.  We include a rich set of 
socioeconomic and criminal justice system variables that are robust 
correlates of the murder rate within and between states over time; these cor-
relates and predictors of homicide have been validated extensively in 
research across cities and states over the past three decades.54  We are 
particularly interested in the effects of incarceration rates in assessing 
whether punishment risks compete with other social and legal factors, 
 
Article’s citations to the DPIC reflect the statistics on its webpage as of July 17, 2006, and archived 
copies of those statistics as of that date are on file with the Texas Law Review. 
52. See Berk, supra note 19, at 320–24 (proving that the deterrent effect of executions 
disappears when Texas execution statistics are eliminated from statistical observations). 
53. See id. at 328 (concluding that the inclusion of “Texas data can give the false impression 
that a deterrence relationship exists” and “distributional problems that characterize the number of 
executions remain when counties are the spatial units”). 
54. See Lauren J. Krivo & Ruth D. Peterson, The Structural Context of Homicide: Accounting 
for Racial Differences in Process, 65 AM. SOC. REV. 547, 558 (2000) (finding that “crime-
generating processes” are correlated with structural and socioeconomic variables and not necessarily 
with race); Kenneth C. Land et al., Structural Covariates of Homicides Rates: Are There Any 
Invariances Across Time and Social Space?, 95 AM. J. SOC. 922, 951 (1990) (“By far, the strongest 
and most invariant effect is due to the resource-deprivation/affluence index; consistently across the 
four decennial census periods, cities, metropolitan areas, or states that are more deprived have 
higher homicide rates, and those that are more affluent have lower rates.”); Robert J. Sampson & 
Janet L. Lauritsen, Violent Victimization and Offending: Individual-, Situational-, and Community-
Level Risk Factors, in 3 UNDERSTANDING AND PREVENTING VIOLENCE: SOCIAL INFLUENCES 1, 48 
(Albert J. Reiss, Jr. & Jeffrey A. Roth eds., 1994) (“Not surprisingly, a large proportion of recent 
neighborhood-based studies of violence have emphasized dimensions of poverty and economic 
inequality.”). 
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including capital punishment, in predicting changes in homicide rates over 
time.55  We include an index for the robbery rate to control for the supply of 
events that produce a large share of capital-eligible homicides.56  We use 
alternate analytic methods that consider time trends in different ways, 
including procedures that account for the strong autocorrelation or 
stationarity of homicide rates over time. 
II. Capital Homicides 
A. The Rules and Grammar of Capital Murder 
One of Furman’s legacies is the development within death penalty 
states of statutory language defining which homicides are eligible for capital 
punishment.  As Professors Jonathan Simon and Christina Spaulding 
comment, these elements of homicides provide a “currency through which 
states seek to recognize various concerns and valorize certain kinds of sub-
jects and situations.”57  Designed to eliminate the arbitrariness in death 
sentencing that underscored death penalty statutes and prosecutorial practices 
before Furman, the new statutes were designed to tighten and rationalize the 
justification for the execution of certain murderers and the exemption of oth-
ers from death.  The elements that informed most states were derived from 
the Model Penal Code58 factors plus a few additional factors that legislators 
included at the time that each state drafted its initial post-Furman law.59  
Simon and Spaulding characterize the ritual addition each year of new 
aggravating factors to capital statutes as akin to state legislatures “hanging 
Christmas ornaments.”60 
Simon and Spaulding list fourteen aggravating factors that characterize 
capital statutes in the post-Gregg era, including the eight in the Model Penal 
Code plus six others that are common to the current era of death penalty 
legislation.61  Some of these aggravators list special victims based on their 
 
55. See, e.g., Katz et al., supra note 10, at 339–40 (reporting a negative correlation between 
prison death rates—a proxy for poor prison conditions—and crime rates, but finding little deterrent 
effect of capital punishment); see also Steven D. Levitt, Understanding Why Crime Fell in the 
1990s: Four Factors that Explain the Decline and Six that Do Not, J. ECON. PERSP., Winter 2004, at 
163, 170–83 (finding four factors that explain the nationwide decrease in crime: the increased 
number of police, the rising prison population, the receding crack cocaine epidemic, and the 
legalization of abortion). 
56. See infra text accompanying note 86 (indicating that 80% of forcible felony killings are 
robbery–homicides). 
57. Jonathan Simon & Christina Spaulding, Tokens of Our Esteem: Aggravating Factors in the 
Era of Deregulated Death Penalties, in THE KILLING STATE: CAPITAL PUNISHMENT IN LAW, 
POLITICS, AND CULTURE 81, 81 (Austin Sarat ed., 1999). 
58. MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.6 cmt. 12 (Revised Commentary 1980). 
59. See id. at cmt. 13 (discussing the addition of “the knowing killing of a police officer, 
fireman, or prison” officer as an aggravating factor as the “most common departure” from the 
Model Penal Code by state legislatures). 
60. Simon & Spaulding, supra note 57, at 82. 
61. See id. at 84 tbl.4.1. 
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vulnerability: the very young and the very old.62  Still others mention killings 
committed by persons serving prison sentences, multiple-victim shootings, 
killings committed in the course of crimes for monetary gain, crimes com-
mitted while fleeing a lawful arrest, and killings of police officers, 
correctional staff, or public officials.63  Between 1972 and 1980, nearly all 
death penalty states adopted the eight aggravating factors from the Model 
Penal Code, and then added a core of other factors that today are commonly 
used in death penalty statutes: heinousness or atrociousness of the act, mur-
ders committed while lying in wait, and killings of witnesses in criminal or 
civil proceedings.64  In a second wave of legislation, following the sharp rise 
in homicides nationally in the late 1980s, legislatures added another set of 
aggravating factors by expanding their felony murder laws.65  These statutes 
listed special circumstances, such as drug deals, gang drive-by shootings, and 
murders or other crimes committed with automatic weapons.  For over a 
decade beginning in the 1980s, these crimes captured the popular 
imagination and animated the political rhetoric and legislative response to the 
nation’s worsening crime problems.66 
These laws on the books provide one component of the logic that we 
used to define capital-eligible homicides.  The contrasting component was 
the law in action.  Beyond the current debate on proportionality is a larger 
question about who exactly is on death row, and the extent to which these 
persons are a mirror of the selection processes that create pools of death-
eligible defendants from among persons arrested for murder.  And until 
recently, there has been almost no systematic research on the types of 
aggravating factors that create death eligibility among persons either selected 
for capital prosecution or sentenced to death by judges or juries.67 
 
62. See id. at 91 tbl.4.2. 
63. Id. 
64. Id. at 84. 
65. See id. at 91 tbl.4.2. 
66. See, e.g., 48 Hours on Crack Street (CBS television broadcast Feb. 19, 1988); see also 
WILLIAM J. BENNETT ET AL., BODY COUNT: MORAL POVERTY . . . AND HOW TO WIN AMERICA’S 
WAR AGAINST CRIME AND DRUGS 14 (1996) (advancing a prediction of a generation of 
“superpredators” who would kill wantonly and randomly and whose crimes would demand 
punishment by death). 
67. One effort to identify which cases among the statutorily capital-eligible were selected for 
prosecution was recently completed in Maryland.  See Raymond Paternoster et al., Justice by 
Geography and Race: The Administration of the Death Penalty in Maryland, 1978–99, 4 U. MD. 
L.J.  RACE, RELIGION, GENDER & CLASS 1, 17 (2004).  Examining 1,311 death-eligible cases from 
1978 to 1999 based on the Maryland statute, MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW § 2-303 (LexisNexis 
2002), Paternoster and his colleagues identified a set of cases that were death-eligible and where 
capital charges were filed.  Maryland’s statute includes a total of fourteen aggravating factors that 
qualify a case as death-eligible.  Id.  The factors that were most common among the death-eligible 
cases are similar to the list compiled by Simon and Spaulding, though with some minor differences.  
See Paternoster et al., supra, at 59 tbl.1.  Although the Maryland study addressed racial disparity, it 
generated statistical information on which statutory aggravating factors were most often present 
among cases selected for capital prosecution: murders committed during other crimes, murders with 
multiple victims, murders committed while the perpetrator was in a correctional institution, contract 
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We turned to Texas as an example of a law in action that produces a 
large set of capital cases.  As most observers of the death penalty know, 
Texas’s total of 369 post-Gregg executions is the highest in the United 
States, accounting for more than one execution in three since 1976, and 
nearly four times more than the 95 executions in Virginia, the next most fre-
quent execution state.68  Texas’s murder statute lists nine aggravating factors 
that create eligibility for the death penalty.69  These factors are similar to the 
Model Penal Code aggravating factors, but are somewhat narrower than the 
longer list of aggravators common in the states today.70  Evidently, both in its 
categorical structure and its implementation, the Texas statute is sufficiently 
broad and flexible—elastic, in effect—as to generate a large number of 
capital-eligible homicides.  The combination of the high rate of executions in 
Texas, the state’s prominent role in the new deterrence literature, and its 
statutory framework provide an ideal setting to identify a set of capital-
eligible cases and to test whether execution has a deterrent effect on that 
subset of cases.  Accordingly, we adopted and operationalized the Texas 
statute as a second framework to identify a set of capital-eligible cases from 
across both death penalty states and nondeath penalty states in the post-
Gregg era. 
B. Applying the Rules 
To identify which homicides were capital-eligible, we turned to the 
Supplementary Homicide Reports, a data archive created and maintained by 
the Federal Bureau of Investigation of the U.S. Department of Justice.  
Known as the SHRs, these case-level records are created by participating po-
lice departments across the country and compiled by the FBI.71  Data are 
available from 1976 to 2003, and include records of 494,729 homicide 
cases.72  The SHR has the unique advantage of providing detailed, case-level 
information about the context and circumstances of each homicide event 
known to the police.73  This allows us to identify the presence of factors that 
map onto the statutory framework of the Texas murder statutes and more 
broadly onto the Model Penal Code aggravating factors. 
 
killings, and murders committed while fleeing capture by police.  Id.  The Maryland study was 
designed to identify racial disparity, so the odds ratio associated with each of the statutory factors 
was not computed. 
68. Death Penalty Info. Ctr., supra note 51. 
69. TEX. PEN. CODE ANN. § 19.03 (Vernon 2006). 
70. See Simon & Spaulding, supra note 57, app. 4A at 102–09 (listing aggravating factors by 
jurisdiction). 
71. Bureau of Justice Statistics, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Homicide Trends in the U.S., 
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/homicide/homtrnd.htm#contents.  The source data are published as 
Uniform Crime Reports [United States]: Supplementary Homicide Reports, 1976–2003 (ICPSR 
Study No. 4351, 2005) [hereinafter SHR], available at 
http://webapp.icpsr.umich.edu/cocoon/ICPSR-STUDY/04351.xml. 
72. SHR, supra note 71. 
73. Id. 
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Much has been written about the Supplementary Homicide Reports, and 
the limitations of the archive are well known.74  Nonreporting by some law 
enforcement agencies is probably the most significant concern, and efforts to 
overcome this limitation have generated the most attention among 
researchers.75  Much of this attention has focused on developing ways to 
revise population estimates of the demographic distribution of homicide vic-
tims and offenders within specific years.76  But for our purposes, missing 
data is a less serious limitation, because we have no reason to suspect that the 
ratio of capital-eligible to other homicides varies systematically in years 
when SHR observations are missing.77  Our concern is with the observed pat-
terns of circumstances and situations, and there is no theoretical or empirical 
reason to suspect that any particular circumstance, especially felony murder, 
would be more or less prevalent in those states where police agencies have 
failed to compile these records. 
To generate estimates of the prevalence of capital homicides, we coded 
each homicide record in the SHR as a capital-eligible homicide if the 
circumstances included any of the following elements that are part of the 
recurrent language of capital-eligible homicides across the states: (a) killings 
during the commission of robbery, burglary, rape or sexual assault, arson, 
and kidnapping; (b) killings of children below age six;78 (c) multiple-victim 
killings; (d) “gangland” killings involving organized crime or street gangs; 
(e) “institution” killings where the offender was confined in a correctional or 
other governmental institution; (f) sniper killings; and (g) killings in the 
course of drug business.  We excluded killings by persons below age sixteen, 
whose eligibility for the death penalty was removed by the United States 
 
74. See, e.g., MALTZ, supra note 23, at 33−39. 
75. See, e.g., Robert L. Flewelling, A Nonparametric Imputation Approach for Dealing With 
Missing Variables in SHR Data, 8 HOMICIDE STUD. 255 (2004) (discussing the nature and extent of 
the non-reporting problem and exploring possible solutions); James Alan Fox, Missing Data 
Problems in the SHR: Imputing Offender and Relationship Characteristics, 8 HOMICIDE STUD. 214 
(2004) (same). 
76. E.g., Flewelling, supra note 75 (developing an imputation method to adjust demographic 
estimates for victims and offenders to more accurately reflect actual populations); Fox, supra note 
75 (same). 
77. See Betsey Stevenson & Justin Wolfers, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: Divorce 
Laws and Family Distress, 121 Q.J. ECON 267, 275 n.15 (2006) (estimating that nonparticipation in 
the SHR produced 37 of 2,754 state-year observations for the period 1964–1996 where missing data 
required interpolation to estimate gender-specific homicide rates). 
78. We included killings of children that are found in the death statutes of states with high death 
sentencing or execution rates (Texas, Maryland, Pennsylvania, Virginia, and Alabama), but are not 
present in several other states with populous death rows or high execution counts (California, 
Florida, and Georgia).  To illustrate, the following states include child killings in their capital 
statutes: ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-703 (F)(9) (2001 & Supp. 2005); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 
5/9-1(b)(7) (West 2002 & Supp. 2005); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:30(A)(5) (1997 & Supp. 2006); 
NEV. REV. STAT. § 200.033(10) (2005); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2903.01(C) (West 1997); 42 PA. 
CONS. STAT. ANN. § 9711(d)(16) (West 1998 & Supp. 2005); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-31(12) (2004).  
Several other states do not mention child killings.  See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 189 (West 2006); 
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 782.04 (West 2000 & Supp. 2006); GA. CODE ANN. § 17-10-30 (2004). 
1818 Texas Law Review [Vol. 84:1803 
 
Supreme Court in Thompson v. Oklahoma in 1988.79  The ban was extended 
in 2005 to all persons below the age of 18 in Roper v Simmons.80  We also 
included a separate count of the killings of police officers.  The annual data 
files, Law Enforcement Officers Killed and Assaulted (LEOKA) also are 
compiled by the U.S. Department of Justice through the FBI.81  A separate 
count for this prominent category of capital-eligible homicides was needed 
because the SHR data do not permit classification of this group of homicides.  
These totals were compiled for both death penalty and nondeath penalty 
states from 1976 to 2003.82  Figure 1 and Table 1 show the types of killings 
and their relative frequency. 
 
79. 487 U.S. 815, 838 (1988).  For a review of the jurisprudence on immaturity and the 
diminished culpability of adolescents in capital trials, see Jeffrey Fagan, Atkins, Adolescence, and 
the Maturity Heuristic: Rationales for a Categorical Exemption for Juveniles from Capital 
Punishment, 33 N.M. L. REV. 207, 234–52 (2003), which discusses evidence of juveniles’ 
immaturity, the risk of false confessions, and the risk of error in attempts to assess individual 
juveniles’ culpability, and Victor L. Streib, Prosecutorial Discretion in Juvenile Homicide Cases, 
109 PENN ST. L. REV. 1071, 1085 (2005), which discusses the importance of limiting the scope of 
prosecutorial discretion in juvenile homicide cases due to the special circumstances in these cases. 
80. 543 U.S. 551 (2005). 
81. LEOKA compiles data from the FBI’s Uniform Crime Reports to create a data archive on 
law enforcement officers killed in the line of duty. In addition to maintaining a machine-readable 
data file, an annual report is published by the FBI.  See, e.g., Fed. Bureau of Investigation, Law 
Enforcement Officers Killed and Assaulted 2004, 
http://www.fbi.gov/ucr/killed/2004/openpage.htm. 
82. Each state was classified in each year as a death penalty or nondeath penalty state according 
to the presence of a valid death penalty statute in that year. 
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Table 1: Capital-eligible homicides, all states83 
Capital-eligible homicides by category 
Category N 
% of all 
homicides 
% of capital-
eligible 
homicides 
Homicides during crimes 59,459 11.8 48.2 
Institution killings 816 0.2 0.7 
Gangland killings 2,138 0.4 1.7 
Youth gang killings 14,298 2.8 11.6 
Sniper killings 489 0.1 0.4 
Murders of children 6 and younger 17,187 3.4 13.9 
Killings of police officers 1,410 0.3 1.1 
Multiple victims 39,168 7.8 31.7 
Total capital-eligible 123,485 24.5 100.0 
Total noncapital-eligible 380,990 75.5  
Total 504,475 100.0   
    
Capital-eligible homicides during crimes by crime type 
Category N 
% of all 
homicides 
% of capital-
eligible 
homicides 
Robbery 46,861 9.3 37.9 
Rape 3,732 0.7 3.0 
Burglary 4,940 1.0 4.0 
Arson 3,926 0.8 3.2 
Total 59,459 11.8 48.2 
83    
 
83. SHR, supra note 71.  For the LEOKA data, see Appendix B.  The Supplementary Homicide 
Reports are filtered to exclude the deaths in New York associated with the attacks of September 11, 
2001, but include those associated with the Oklahoma City bombing of April 19, 1995. 
 Capital-eligible homicides are limited to those committed by offenders ages 16 or above and 
those with unknown offender ages.  Homicides committed by offenders younger than 16 are not 
considered capital-eligible.  (It is likely that some of the “unknown offender” homicides were also 
committed by offenders under 16).  Overall, 2.6% of homicides with offenders of known age were 
committed by juveniles.  Whether homicides with offenders of unknown ages are similarly 
distributed is uncertain. 
 Total capital-eligible homicides is less than the sum of the individual categories, due to overlaps 
in the categories.  For example, among homicides not committed by juveniles, 6,798 committed in 
the course of other crimes also had multiple victims; and, 880 homicides committed in the course of 
other crimes also had child victims.  Also, killings of police officers was added in separately since 
these cases were not identifiable in the SHR records. 
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Figure 1: Murder and non-negligent homicide: Potentially death-eligible and 
other killings, 1976–200384 
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84. See supra note 83. 
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Table 2: Capital-eligible homicides, Texas, 1977–200385 
Capital-eligible homicides by category 
Category N 
% of all 
homicides 
% of capital-
eligible 
homicides 
Homicides during crimes 5,723 11.6 54.6 
Institution killings 117 0.2 1.1 
Gangland killings 259 0.5 2.5 
Youth gang killings 155 0.3 1.5 
Sniper killings 18 0.0 0.2 
Murders of children 6 and younger 1,520 3.1 14.5 
Killings of police officers 148 0.3 1.4 
Multiple victims 3,725 7.5 35.6 
Total capital-eligible 10,476 21.1 100.0 
Total noncapital-eligible 39,060 78.9   
Total 49,536 100.0   
    
Capital-eligible homicides during crimes by crime type 
Category N 
% of all 
homicides 
% of capital-
eligible 
homicides 
Robbery 4,583 9.3 43.7 
Rape 354 0.7 3.4 
Burglary 606 1.2 5.8 
Arson 180 0.4 1.7 
Total 5,723 11.6 54.6 
 
Across all states, a total of 24.5% of all reported killings were 
potentially death-eligible types of cases, with the lion’s share of these being 
forcible felony killings (11.8%) and killings with multiple victims (7.8%).86  
A small number of capital-eligible homicides were killings of children 
(3.4%).  Among the forcible felony killings, nearly eight in ten 
(46,861/59,459, or 78.8%) were robbery killings. 
 
85. See supra note 83. 
86. We excluded from the probable capital cases FBI-classified drug cases (4.3%) and auto-
theft killings (0.7%) noted by police.  The drug category includes some cases that may be death-
eligible under federal law and the auto cases that involve robberies would also count as robberies.  
For state criminal law purposes, these cases are not death eligible without forcible felony 
involvement.  See generally Death Penalty Info. Ctr., Crimes Punishable by the Death Penalty, 
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/article.php?did=144&scid=10 (listing crimes punishable by death 
state-by-state). 
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There were small differences in these distributions for death penalty and 
nondeath penalty states.  In death penalty states, felony killings comprised 
11.6% of all homicides, multiple-victim homicides were 7.7%, and 
homicides with child victims were 3.3%.  In nondeath penalty states, felony 
killings were 12.5% of all homicides, multiple-victim homicides were 8.0%, 
and homicides with child victims were 3.6%.87 
We repeated this analysis for homicides in Texas during the same 
period.  The portion of homicides in Texas in this period that were 
potentially capital-eligible cases was slightly lower than the rate reported in 
Table 1: 21.1%.  Most of these were forcible felony killings (11.6%) and 
killings with multiple victims (7.5%).  As in the national estimate, a small 
number of capital-eligible homicides were killings of children (3.1%).  
Among the felony murders, the plurality again were robbery–homicides 
(43.7%, or 80% of all felony murders). 
There are two major problems with trying to measure the extent of 
additional deterrence from a capital threat by the study of variation in a crime 
category where three-fourths of the offenses are not eligible for death.  First, 
if there is any marginal deterrence from variations in execution risk, 
including so many cases where there was no risk of execution might dilute 
the apparent deterrence from those cases where the risk of execution was 
real.  Any deterrent threat should be clustered in death-eligible cases, so in-
cluding masses of ineligible cases reduces the apparent impact of the threat.  
Why not simply test the impact of execution risk on some aggregate crime 
category, like index crime as a whole or on all violent felonies?  A fair test of 
deterrence should restrict the presumed dependent variable to those cases 
where the law intends to threaten death—on the 25% of cases where death is 
a possibility and not on the 75% of cases where it is not.  The inclusion of so 
many cases where death is not a threatened sanction also risks falsely con-
cluding that changes over time in homicide rates are caused by variations in 
threatened or administered rates of execution.  The inclusion of all homicides 
assumes that the deterrent effect of execution is highly inelastic across a very 
heterogeneous set of circumstances and individuals of varying capacities.  
Adding in so many noncapital cases risks creating an ocean of artificial 
deterrence. 
1. Testing the Accuracy of the Classifications.—The number and 
variety of death-eligible cases in Figure 1 and Table 1 were derived from the 
Supplementary Homicide Reports (SHR), an archive produced by the FBI as 
part of its Uniform Crime Report series.  The SHR archive provides infor-
mation about the circumstances in the majority of death-eligible killings, but 
not in all categories of death-eligible killings that are identified in the 
 
87. Data are available from the authors at http://www2.law.columbia.edu/fagan/researchdata/ 
caphom/. 
2006] Capital Punishment and Capital Murder 1823 
 
majority of state statutes.  For example, the SHR records provide sufficient 
information to identify homicides committed during the commission of other 
crimes (felony murders), institution killings, multiple-victim killings, sniper 
killings, and killings of very young children or the very old.  But the SHR 
records do not provide information to identify cases of murder-for-hire, some 
of the murders that are capital-eligible because of the heinous or atrocious 
nature of the act, or murders of police officers. 
To test the accuracy and comprehensiveness of the SHR categories that 
we used to segregate killings that carry a risk of a capital sentence, we 
identified the 100 most recent consecutive executions reported in U.S. court 
records as of March 1, 2006, listed in the execution database maintained by 
the Death Penalty Information Center (DPIC).88  The DPIC database has the 
capacity to generate lists of executions according to user-selected identifiers 
such as state, defendant characteristics, and time period.  To estimate the 
coverage of the SHR records among the universe of executed persons, we 
identified the 100 most recent executions and then obtained court records that 
stated the circumstances of the murder for which the defendants were exe-
cuted.  We then coded these cases to determine the specific statutory 
aggravators that these cases reflected.  This procedure generated an index of 
the proportion of actual executions which were identified as death-eligible in 
our classification system. 
The sample of executions covers the period from June 8, 2004 to 
February 15, 2006, beginning with William Zuern in the state of Ohio and 
concluding with Clyde Smith Jr. in Texas.  In our analysis, all but five of the 
100 cases would appear as death-eligible based on our definition.  The ex-
ceptions were three homicides that we classified as “contract killings” or 
“murder-for-hire,” and two characterized by the court and classified by us as 
“exceptional cruelty” (“atrocious” or “heinous”). 
These results validate the accuracy of the classification system that we 
used to identify capital-eligible homicides.  Extrapolating this 95% accuracy, 
we estimate that the true proportion of death-eligible cases is 25% of total 
killings, and that 95% of these are in our death-eligible class.  We also esti-
mate that the proportion of cases misclassified as not death-eligible is five for 
every 300 cases classified as nondeath-eligible (the ratio of non-eligible to 
eligible is greater than three to 1).  That is, we estimate that 1.67% of the 
group that we classified as nondeath-eligible is likely to be death-eligible.  
The cases in our death-eligible category are about 60 times more likely to 
end up with death sentences as cases in the non-eligible category. 
We also checked the extent to which our categories of potentially death-
eligible killing in Texas covered cases that generated actual executions.  We 
examined the most recent fifty cases that led to executions in Texas as of 
 
88. Death Penalty Info. Ctr., Searchable Database of Executions, 
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/executions.php [hereinafter DPIC, Searchable Database]. 
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May 10, 2006, beginning with Kenneth Bruce on January 14, 2004, and 
ending with Jackie Wilson on May 4, 2006.89  All but two of these fifty cases 
fit exactly our statutory criteria and definition.  The two that were not in-
cluded in our definition were “contract killings,” an aggravating factor that is 
frequently unknown when a case is listed by local police agencies when 
compiling their SHR reports.  Accordingly, we estimate the definition of 
capital-eligible homicides in this study captures 96% of all Texas homicides 
that result in death sentences and executions, a figure comparable to the 95% 
accuracy estimate for all the death penalty states. 
C. Execution and the Market Share of Capital Homicides 
The study of trends in only death-eligible cases should solve both of the 
problems associated with aggregating capital and noncapital killings.  If exe-
cution risk is driving homicide levels, then this should be a specific effect 
observed in death-eligible cases but not in other types of homicide.  If, 
however, temporal influences independent of the death penalty are producing 
false inferences about deterrence, then we would expect to see similar trends 
in capital and noncapital-eligible homicides.  That is why what we call the 
“market share” of death-eligible homicides is critical to our study. 
Figures 2a–2c show the trends for the nation, and then separately for 
death penalty and nondeath penalty states.  Recall that a state is a death pen-
alty state in any year only if there was a valid death penalty statute in effect 
in that state during that specific year.  To frame these trends, note that exe-
cutions were a relatively rare event in the United States before 1984: execu-
tions rose from 5 nationally in 1983 to 21 in 1984, declined to 11 in 1988, 
and then rose steadily for over a decade—peaking in 1999 with 98 
executions nationally before declining again to 59 in 2004.90 
 
 
89. Id. 
90. Death Penalty Info. Ctr., Executions by Year, 
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/article.php?scid=8&did=146. 
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Figure 2a: Capital and noncapital homicide rate per 100,000 persons and 
percent capital, all states, 1976–200391 
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Figure 2b: Capital and noncapital homicide rate per 100,000 persons and 
percent capital, death penalty states, 1976–200392 
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91. See SHR, supra note 71. 
92. See id. 
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Figure 2c: Capital and noncapital homicide rate per 100,000 persons and 
percent capital, nondeath penalty states, 1976–200393 
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Figure 2a shows the national trend for all states from 1976 to 2003.  The 
index of capital-eligible murders varies within a narrow range over nearly 
three decades, from a low of 1 per 100,000 persons in 2000 to a high of 2 per 
100,000 persons in 1993.  The long-term trend in noncapital murders shows a 
large decline over the same period, with a decline of nearly 50% from 1980 
to 2000.  Most important for our analysis is the long-term rise in the market 
share of homicides that are capital-eligible.  The market share rises from a 
low of approximately 22% in 1975 to a peak of nearly 28% in 1995, and then 
varies by one percent each year above or below the 28% level through 2003. 
This pattern also is evident in death penalty states.  Figure 2b shows the 
same roller coaster pattern of capital-eligible homicides and a similar secular 
decline of more than 50% in noncapital homicides.  The market share of 
capital-eligible crimes rises substantially in the death penalty states, from 
approximately 18% in 1975 to 27% in 1995.  The market share fluctuates in a 
narrow range for the next nine years before returning to its previous high in 
2004.  The rise in market share of capital-eligible homicides was concurrent 
with a rise in executions (21 in 1984 to 98 in 1999). 
Figure 2c identifies similar trends over the same period in states without 
the death penalty.  Homicide rates are lower in these states over time, and the 
partitioned rates reflect the general base rate differences between death pen-
alty and nondeath penalty states.  The pattern of capital-eligible homicides 
fluctuates over time in a manner similar to the death penalty states.  The 
market share of capital-eligible homicides in the nondeath penalty states 
varies erratically, between a high of 26% in both the early and later years of 
 
93. See id. 
Share of 
killings 
capital-
eligible 
in death 
penalty 
states 
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the time series to a low of 19% in 1988, a year when executions were rare.  
The secular decline in noncapital homicides is sharpest beginning in 1995, 
when New York State passed a death penalty statute and its capital-eligible 
and other homicides were removed from this count.94 
Every indication in the pattern over time of trends in death-eligible 
homicides is inconsistent with the anticipated influence of either a death 
penalty law or variations in rates of execution specifically on those types of 
homicide that these laws target.  First, there is little variation in the rates of 
capital-eligible homicides over time.  Second, the shape of the temporal 
trends in capital-eligible homicides in death penalty states and nondeath pen-
alty states is nearly identical.  That is, there is no visible influence of the 
death penalty on those cases where its impact should be concentrated.  The 
fluctuations are timed nearly identically, and the range is also identical, both 
in timing and magnitude.  Rates of death-eligible killings do not go down any 
faster than non-eligible killings when execution rates go up, and the death-
eligible types of killings are no greater a share of the total in states with no 
death penalty.  The trends in these death-eligible types of killings over time 
are no different in active execution states than in nondeath penalty states. 
There appears to be no difference in capital-eligible homicide rates that 
can be attributed either to the presence of the death penalty or the frequency 
of its use.  One of the staples of the death penalty debate in the United States 
is the interpretation of the base rate differences in homicides between death 
penalty and nondeath penalty states.  Critics of the death penalty point to this 
differential as evidence of its weak deterrent effects.95  Our analysis provides 
some confirmation of this claim, but for a very different reason: there is no 
difference in the magnitude or temporal change in the subset of homicides 
that should be most sensitive to the threat of execution. 
D. Texas as a Natural Experiment 
Several studies in the new deterrence literature point to Texas as the 
place where the deterrent effects of execution may be the strongest.96  
Among states, Texas is the most frequent user of capital punishment in the 
post-Gregg era, accounting for 369 of the 1,032 executions in the United 
 
94. 1995 N.Y. Laws 2 (codified as amended at N.Y. PENAL LAW § 60.06 (McKinney 2005)). 
95. SELLIN, supra note 25, at 34; see Donohue & Wolfers, supra note 10, at 800−04 (discussing 
studies of the differences of homicide rates in death penalty and nondeath penalty states); see also 
John Lamperti, Does Capital Punishment Deter Murder? (2001) (unpublished manuscript), available 
at http://math.dartmouth.edu/~lamperti/capitalpunishment.pdf (analyzing studies to conclude that 
the death penalty does not deter or decrease the frequency of homicide). 
96. See, e.g., Cloninger & Marchesini, supra note 10, at 571–76 (reporting empirical findings in 
Texas consistent with the deterrent hypothesis); Joanna Shepherd, Deterrence Versus Brutalization: 
Capital Punishment’s Differing Impacts Among States, 104 MICH. L. REV. 203, 233 (2005) (finding 
a strong deterrent effect in Texas).  But see Berk, supra note 19, at 324, 328 (asserting that data give 
a “false impression” of deterrence in Texas due to three outlier years). 
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States since 1976.97  This gives Texas unusual leverage on the relationship 
between executions and homicides in comparative analyses across states.98  
Indeed, recent social science analyses of general homicide patterns have 
shown that the evidence of execution impact on total homicide can be dis-
missed for U.S. death states other than Texas.99  And within Texas, both 
death sentences and executions are concentrated in Harris County, which in-
cludes the city of Houston.100  Since 1976, Harris County has accounted for 
90 of the 369 executions in Texas in the time since Gregg, more than twice 
the number in Dallas County, the state’s second highest contributor to 
Texas’s death row.101 
In addition, 282 persons from Harris County have been sentenced to 
death since Gregg,102 and there are currently 137 on death row.103  The 
county’s high execution rate affords it statistical influence on the deterrence 
patterns that have been attributed to Texas.  Accordingly, if executions show 
a distinctive impact on death-eligible killings anywhere, Texas should be the 
place.  Given the high rate of executions in Texas, the case for the impact of 
the death penalty on total homicide over time cannot be so easily dismissed 
for Texas.  Figures 3 and 4 show the trends in capital-eligible and noncapital 
homicide rates for Texas and Harris County, and the market share of capital-
eligible homicides in each. 
 
 
97. According to DPIC, there have been 1,032 executions in the U.S. from Gregg through July 
17, 2006. See Death Penalty Info. Ctr., Executions by State, 
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/article.php?scid=8&did=186. 
98. See Berk, supra note 19, at 305 (explaining how the large number of executions in Texas 
can skew statistical results). 
99. Id. at 320–23. 
100. Tex. Dep’t of Criminal Justice, County of Conviction for Executed Offenders, 
http://www.tdcj.state.tx.us/stat/countyexecuted.htm.  The Texas Department of Criminal Justice’s 
website displays a number of statistical tables about the death penalty, which are periodically 
updated to take account of new death sentences, executions, and exonerations.  This Article’s 
citations to the Texas Department of Criminal Justice reflect the statistics on its webpage as of July 
17, 2006, and archived copies of those statistics as of that date are on file with the Texas Law 
Review. 
101. Id. 
102. Tex. Dep’t of Criminal Justice, Total Number of Offenders Sentenced to Death from Each 
County, http://www.tdcj.state.tx.us/stat/countysentenced.htm. 
103. Tex. Dep’t of Criminal Justice, County of Conviction for Offenders on Death Row, 
http://www.tdcj.state.tx.us/stat/countyconviction.htm. 
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Figure 3: Capital and noncapital homicide rate per 100,000 persons and 
percent capital, Texas, 1976–2003104 
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The patterns in Texas closely resemble the patterns for all the death 
penalty states shown in Figure 2b.  Capital-eligible homicides rise and fall 
over time, varying from a rate of 2 per 100,000 persons in 1976 to a peak of 
4 before declining to a low rate of 1.8 in 1999 and beginning a shallow rise in 
the next four years through 2003.  The rates fell by nearly half, from 4 per 
100,000 persons, to less than 2 in 1996.  The market share of capital-eligible 
homicides rises across the entire interval, and nearly doubles from 15% in 
1988 to 29% in 2003.  Similar to other states, noncapital homicides dropped 
sharply from 1990 to 1998 and have remained stable since.  Since Texas re-
sumed executions in 1982, its execution activity was consistently well above 
the national average for death penalty states.105  But executions were 
extraordinarily high between 1996 and 2003.  More than two-thirds of the 
post-Gregg executions took place in those years, with a peak of 40 
executions in 2000 and another peak of 33 executions in 2002.106  During this 
time, the rate of capital-eligible homicides was virtually unchanged, from 1.8 
per 100,000 persons in 1996 to 2.0 in 2003. 
One would expect the rate of capital-eligible homicides to decline 
steadily during years when there is very high execution activity.  Assuming 
that would-be offenders who might be sensitive to execution risk are updat-
ing their information frequently, these updates based on high execution risk 
seem to have had little effect on the commission of capital-eligible murders.  
Executions in Texas were proceeding at a very high rate during this time, 
averaging almost three per month during the four-year period from 1997 to 
 
104. See SHR, supra note 71. 
105. See Death Penalty Info. Ctr., supra note 97 (showing that Texas has executed 369 inmates 
since 1972, far outstripping second-place Virginia, with 95). 
106. Tex. Dep’t of Criminal Justice, Executions by Year, 
http://www.tdcj.state.tx.us/stat/annual.htm. 
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2000 inclusive.107  Even allowing for a lag of a year or more, capital-eligible 
homicide rates in the succeeding years seemed unresponsive to the increase 
in executions in the late 1990s.108 
 
Figure 4: Capital and noncapital homicide rate per 100,000 persons and 
fraction capital, Harris County, 1976–2003109 
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The second natural experiment is Harris County.  A single county case 
study has strong internal validity, due to the stability over time in legal 
contexts that surround the decision to seek and apply the death penalty, and 
the absence of noise from variations in legal contexts and the factors that 
may drive murder rates over time in other parts of the state and the 
country.110  Consistent with statewide trends in Texas and national trends in 
the death penalty states, the market share of capital-eligible homicides rose in 
Harris County from the onset of post-Gregg executions through 2003.  
Figure 4 also shows that the temporal fluctuation in the rate of capital-
eligible homicides in Harris County is nearly identical to the statewide and 
national trends.111  Rates remained stable from 1996 through 2001, the period 
 
107. Id. 
108. The period when such updates take place is a matter of theoretical speculation.  At least 
one proponent of the deterrent effects of execution has suggested that updates may be as frequent as 
monthly.  See, e.g., Shepherd, supra note 15, at 309 (suggesting that “capital punishment’s deterrent 
effect is captured in the monthly data regardless of the particulars of the model”). 
109. See SHR, supra note 71. 
110. See, e.g., JAMES EISENSTEIN & HERBERT JACOB, FELONY JUSTICE: AN ORGANIZATIONAL 
ANALYSIS OF CRIMINAL COURTS (1977) (discussing court processes in Baltimore, Chicago, and 
Detroit and showing how stable working groups of court officers function in courts to establish 
shared guidelines and rules for the evaluation and disposition of criminal cases). 
111. We retained data from 1982, when rates were sharply lower than other years, despite the 
indication of problems in data compilation and reporting for Harris County in that year. 
Potential 
capital-
eligible 
share 
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when execution activity in the state was at its peak.  Noncapital homicides 
declined sharply from 1991 through 2000, in the same periods, capital-
eligible homicides fell before rising after 2000.  There was little change in 
capital-eligible homicides in Texas following the surge in executions in the 
late 1990s, and rates remained stable as executions declined in Texas after 
1999. 
Together, the Texas and Harris County exercises confirm the trends 
across death penalty states: the market share of homicides that are capital-
eligible continued to rise in the face of higher execution rates. 
E. The Opposite of Economics? 
The most logical test of “price effect” deterrence, that is whether the 
threat of death is driving homicide fluctuations in death penalty states, is 
whether the subset of killings threatened with death decline more sharply 
than in states where an execution will not happen.  As executions go up, the 
percentage of homicides where a death sentence is possible should go down 
in the death penalty states, and particularly in Texas, the only state with any 
apparent deterrence in the aggregate homicide data.112  But there should be 
no such fluctuation in nondeath penalty states because there is no death threat 
for this class of cases. 
This distinctive pattern does not happen.  The patterns are visible to the 
naked eye.  The fingerprint for execution influence is missing from Harris 
County, from Texas as a whole, and from all death penalty states.  Instead, 
the market share is rising everywhere except the nondeath penalty states.  
Offenders faced with the threat of execution are not substituting less risky 
varieties of crime for crimes that lead to murder and capital risk, nor are they 
abandoning the types of crimes that might lead to a capital offense.  But they 
do seem to be rejecting the types of murders that do not carry execution 
risk.113  Evidently, secular trends or risk factors other than executions are 
animating the aggregate homicide totals in Texas and elsewhere.  This is the 
opposite of recent price effect economic theories of death penalty deterrence. 
The insensitivity of capital-eligible homicides to execution trends is 
especially surprising when considered in the context of the sharply declining 
rates of other homicides.  As these noncapital-eligible homicides decrease in 
number, it would be logical that police and prosecutors would devote more 
attention to the smaller number of capital-eligible cases.  Greater resources 
would be available for police investigations and clearance rates should 
improve.  Prosecutors also would have more time and greater resources to 
devote to these cases, increasing the likelihood of lengthy prison sentences if 
not capital sentences.  Yet even this concentration of criminal justice re-
 
112. See Berk, supra note 19, at 320–24 (finding that all of the generalized deterrent effects in 
studies are attributable to Texas). 
113. Figure 2b shows an overall declining trend of noncapital homicide rates in all death 
penalty states.  Even when only examining Texas, Figure 3 confirms that trend. 
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sources on capital-eligible cases has not leveraged a decline in the rate of 
capital-eligible homicides. 
The trends argue not against deterrence, but against the marginal 
deterrent effects of execution threats.  Prison sentences and prison 
populations have been increasing dramatically since 1978,114 and the largest 
segment of the prison population is inmates convicted of violent crimes.115  
At year end in 2002, there were 2.1 million persons incarcerated in state 
prisons, including an estimated 624,900 prisoners for a violent offense.116  
Overall, the 2004 incarceration rate in state prisons was 486 per 100,000 
population.117  The high rate of incarceration and the increasingly lengthy 
sentences imposed for violent offenses118 may leave little margin for addi-
tional deterrent effects from the threat of execution. 
In fact, the marginal punishment cost from the threat of execution may 
be discounted in the modal category of capital-eligible crimes: felony 
murders—homicides committed in the course of other crimes, especially 
robbery.  The logic of criminal careers and the composition of the pool of 
capital-eligible homicides combine to argue against a marginal deterrent ef-
fect from the threat of execution.  Robbery is not a crime that is committed 
casually, nor are robbers a random sample of the criminal population.  Most 
have prior arrest records and many have completed spells in prison.119  Most 
acknowledge the risk of punishment as intrinsic to their work yet tend to dis-
count the cost of punishment or overvalue present benefits of the robbery, or 
both.120  Moreover, the situational dynamics of robbery are volatile and 
unpredictable, and there is a very weak prospect that a risk heuristic of 
punishment will enter into the intense street dynamics of robbery interactions 
 
114. Alfred Blumstein & Allen J. Beck, Population Growth in U.S. Prisons, 1980–1996, 26 
CRIME & JUST. 17, 18 (1999) (“Beginning in the early 1970s, the incarceration rate began a period 
of continuous growth of approximately 6.3 percent per year that has continued largely unabated to 
the present.”). 
115.  Paige M. Harrison & Allen J. Beck, Prisoners in 2004, BUREAU JUST. STAT. BULL., Oct. 
2005, at 3 tbl.3, available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/p04.pdf. 
116. Id. at 9. 
117. Id. at 3, 4 tbl.4. 
118. In 2002, the average state prison sentence for a violent offense was eighty-four months, a 
rate that excludes life sentences.  Matthew R. Durose & Patrick A. Langan, Felony Sentences in 
State Courts, 2002, BUREAU JUST. STAT. BULL., Dec. 2004, at 4, available at 
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/fssc02.pdf. 
119. See, e.g., RICHARD T. WRIGHT & SCOTT H. DECKER, ARMED ROBBERS IN ACTION: 
STICKUPS AND STREET CULTURE 14 (1997).  Wright and Decker interviewed men whose criminal 
careers included repeated robberies.  Robbers were committed to a street culture that emphasized 
the material rewards and social status attendant to being successful “stick candy men,” while 
minimizing or heavily discounting punishment risk.  Id. at 16; see also KATZ, supra note 32, at 165 
(stating that robbers who “persist in robbery for several years . . . must anticipate a break in their 
career for a long term of incarceration”); MERCER L. SULLIVAN, “GETTING PAID”: YOUTH CRIME 
AND WORK IN THE INNER CITY (1989) (examining the lives of three Brooklyn-area youths who had 
prior arrest records before committing robberies). 
120. WRIGHT & DECKER, supra note 119, at 118. 
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to reduce the risk of lethality,121 especially when a gun is present.  The pres-
ence of a gun in a robbery further increases not just the risk of lethality but 
the decision by the robber to use it.122  In other words, there is a strong risk of 
cognitive errors in situations of intense arousal—errors that are likely to 
mitigate the deterrent effects of punishment risk.123 
Felony murder offenders should be deterred both by the threat of prison 
and the threat of execution.  But there seems to be no visible marginal threat 
from execution because both long prison sentences and execution are 
punishment costs, not risks.  Perhaps present-oriented offenders discount 
such costs, reducing the salience of the threat of execution, leaving the 
margin for deterrence very thin. 
III. Estimating the Deterrent Effects of Execution on Capital Homicides 
A. Design 
Next, we use panel methods to estimate a series of regression models to 
identify the effects of capital punishment on the rate of capital-eligible 
homicides from the resumption of capital punishment in the United States in 
1976 following Gregg through 2002.  We estimate models both for the nation 
and for Texas.  The panel structure of the data lends itself to a class of statis-
tical models that explicitly examine how time-varying factors—including 
capital punishment and other social and legal conditions—influence homi-
cide trajectories that vary through time in an autoregressive structure. 
Consistent with Sellin’s strategy for estimating the effects of capital 
punishment,124 we include estimators for states that do not have the death 
penalty.  In the logic of experiments, an effect of execution on the homicide 
rate should be observed only in the states that have or use the death penalty.  
 
121. Id.; see also Jack Katz, The Motivation of the Persistent Robber, 14 CRIME & JUST. 277, 
283–290 (1991) (arguing that robbers do not engage in rational behavior); Franklin Zimring & 
James Zuehl, Victim Injury and Death in Urban Robbery: A Chicago Study, 15 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 
33 (1986) (arguing that the malice rule, or any variation, would likely have a small effect on 
robbery behavior). 
122. See Jeffrey Fagan & Deanna L. Wilkinson, Social Contexts and Functions of Adolescent 
Violence, in VIOLENCE IN AMERICAN SCHOOLS: A NEW PERSPECTIVE 55, 62 (D.S. Elliott et al. 
eds., 1999) (“The availability of a firearm may encourage a robber to . . . rely on a threat of force 
which may or may not need to be followed through.”); Deanna L. Williams & Jeffery Fagan, The 
Role of Firearms in Violence “Scripts”: The Dynamics of Gun Events Among Adolescent Males, 
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Winter 1996, at 55, 71 (noting that “the availability and lethal nature of 
firearms has resulted in offenders taking on ‘risky or harder’ targets, anticipating little or no 
resistance when using a lethal weapon”); Zimring & Zuehl, supra note 121, at 14–16 (showing, 
statistically, that robberies involving guns are more likely to be lethal). 
123. See Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Choices, Values and Frames, 39 AM. 
PSYCHOLOGIST 341, 349 (1984) (finding that “an individual’s subjective state can be improved by 
framing negative outcomes as costs rather than as losses”). 
124. Thorsten Sellin, Homicides in Retentionist and Abolitionist States, in CAPITAL 
PUNISHMENT 135, 135 (Thorsten Sellin ed., 1967); see also Thorsten Sellin, Experiments with 
Abolition, in CAPITAL PUNISHMENT, supra, at 122, 122. 
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In states with the death penalty, the logic of medical experiments suggests 
that we also investigate how responsive each state is to varying dosages of a 
“treatment” like capital punishment.  Accordingly, we include two measures 
of capital punishment: the existence of a death penalty statute in each state 
for each year in the panel and then the number of executions and death sen-
tences in the state for each of the preceding three years. 
We adjust the estimates of deterrence to control for variations from state 
to state in the base rates of homicide by including the noncapital homicide 
rate in each state for each year (lagged by one year).  This strategy allows us 
to estimate whether the changes in the noncapital homicide rate are influ-
encing the rate of capital homicides.  Using population-averaged models, we 
scale the number of executions to each state’s population to ensure that any 
deterrent effects from execution are weighted proportionately to the state’s 
population. 
We include a rich set of socioeconomic and criminal justice system 
variables that are robust correlates of the murder rate within and between 
states over time; these correlates and predictors of homicide have been vali-
dated extensively in research across cities and states over the past three 
decades.125  However, some of these factors also may be spuriously 
correlated with the adoption of capital punishment and its use,126 and 
statistical methods are needed to sort out these multiple and overlapping 
factors and to better isolate the causal effect of executions above and beyond 
the endogenous reasons why it is used. 
For example, the rate at which prosecutors may seek the death penalty, 
the rate at which judges and juries might impose it, and the rate at which 
states may carry out death sentences, all may be correlated with the onset of 
other criminal justice measures, such as tough sentencing laws or expanded 
death penalty eligibility, that are designed to “get tough on crime.”  Estimat-
ing the effects of capital punishment is further complicated by contempora-
neous increases in the likelihood of incarceration, longer prison sentences 
including “natural” life sentences (or life without parole) that may compete 
with the threat of execution to deter homicides.  And, these contingencies 
also may deter other crimes as well. 
We are particularly interested in the effects of incarceration rates in 
assessing whether punishment risks compete with other social and legal 
 
125. See Krivo & Peterson, supra note 54, at 558; Land et al., supra note 54, at 951; Sampson 
& Lauritsen, supra note 54, at 48. 
126. See JAMES LIEBMAN ET AL., A BROKEN SYSTEM PART II: WHY THERE IS SO MUCH 
ERROR IN CAPITAL CASES, AND WHAT CAN BE DONE ABOUT IT 425 (2002), available at 
http://www2.law.columbia.edu/brokensystem2/report.pdf (showing that factors including the 
poverty rate, the percent of the population that is African American, and indices of each state’s 
punitiveness (or use of incarceration) predict the use of the death penalty and the number and rate of 
reversals of death sentences). 
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factors, including capital punishment, and in predicting changes in homicide 
rates over time.127  Since robbery–homicide is the paradigm crime among the 
subset of felony murders that are capital-eligible homicides,128 we also in-
clude an index for the robbery rate to control for the supply of events that 
might produce capital-eligible homicides.  We use alternate analytic methods 
that consider time trends in different ways, including procedures that account 
for the strong autocorrelation or stationarity of homicide rates over time, and 
we develop parameters to address selection biases inherent in the decisions of 
states to adopt the death penalty. 
B. Model Estimation 
Several new studies claim strong deterrent effects of capital 
punishment.129  They share a common econometric language and preferences 
for particular analytic strategies.  Typically, these studies use panel data on 
murder rates within states or counties over a number of years.  We use that 
form to begin the analysis.  The general analytic form is a regression 
equation where the murder rate in each state and year in the time series (or 
panel) is the dependent variable, and the predictors are a linear combination 
of fixed effects including the presence of a death penalty law in a given state 
and the predictability of execution given a death sentence in some previous 
era.  Covariates include state effects that account for differences between the 
states and year effects that account for national time trends that affect the 
states.  The general model form is: 
Yij = βij-1DETERRENCE + γijCONTROLS + δijNONCAP + µi + ηj +  εij 
where Yij is the rate of capital-eligible murders in state i and year j, 
DETERRENCE is a combination of execution and death sentence measures 
lagged for different periods, and CONTROLS is a combination of state social 
and economic characteristics that are well known predictors of both criminal 
activity and the use of the death penalty.  We include each state’s robbery 
rate in each year in this set of covariates, since robberies are a measure both 
of the general level of criminal activity and also of the potential supply of 
robbery–homicide incidents that comprise a significant portion of capital-
 
127. See, e.g., Katz et al., supra note 10, at 339–40 (reporting a negative correlation between 
prison death rates—a proxy for poor prison conditions—and crime rates, but finding little deterrent 
effect of capital punishment); see also Fagan, supra note 19 (critiquing recent research on the 
deterrent effects of the death penalty for inadequately measuring and estimating the effects of 
incarceration and other criminal justice policy measures on changes in the homicide rate); Levitt, 
supra note 55, at 170–83 (finding four factors that explain the nationwide decrease in crime: the 
expansion in the number of police, the increasing prison population, the retreating epidemic of crack 
cocaine, and the legalization of abortion). 
128. See supra note 86 and accompanying text. 
129. See Hearing, supra note 13, at 10–11, 14–16 (discussing the results of thirteen studies that 
found deterrent effects); see also Donohue & Wolfers, supra note 10 (surveying the data from 
several studies that found deterrent effects); Fagan, supra note 19 (same). 
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eligible crimes.130  In this study, where the market share of homicides that are 
capital-eligible is a central question, we also include the rate of noncapital-
eligible homicides. (Details on these measures are discussed in the next 
section.)  State and year fixed effects (µi + ηj) also are included in the 
estimation.131  In this study, we estimate first a state-level model and next a 
model with counties in Texas. 
We begin the analysis by estimating this model form to determine how 
the death penalty influences the rate of capital-eligible homicides, with the 
presence of a death penalty statute in each state and year as the deterrence 
measure.  Next, we estimate similar models but this time using measures of 
executions and death sentences as the deterrence variables.  For each of these 
versions of deterrence, we first estimate a model with predictors limited to 
the rate of noncapital homicides and the covariates.  We then re-estimate the 
models with the deterrence variables included. 
In this general model form, using fixed effects for states (or counties) 
and years treats each area as having inherent unobservable characteristics 
that are consistent over time and independent of other areas.  Likewise, the 
use of fixed effects treats each year as a separate experimental period, with 
its own characteristics that are independent of the previous year’s.  Such 
models are common in the recent deterrence literature, and we thus begin 
with a fixed effects model predicting capital homicide rates based on these 
state and year characteristics and controlling for noncapital homicide rates. 
However, the reality of panel data suggests that this method will 
produce biased estimates: the strategy ignores the fact that murder rates 
within states vary through time, and that murder rates, whether within states 
or counties, are serially correlated over time.132  This is the problem of 
autoregression, or serial correlation: the tendency of trends in longitudinal or 
time series data to be heavily influenced by the trends in preceding years.  
Statistically and conceptually, it is unlikely that effects of extremely rare 
events such as executions can influence trends that are so heavily influenced 
by their own history.133 
 
130. See supra Tables 1 & 2. 
131. Most studies estimate models with states as the unit of analysis, while others include 
models where county murder rates are predicted from a combination of state- and county-level 
predictors. See, e.g., Hashem Dezhbakhsh et al., Does Capital Punishment Have a Deterrent Effect? 
New Evidence from Postmoratorium Panel Data, 5 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 344 (2003). 
132. See, e.g., Marianne Bertrand et al., How Much Should We Trust Differences-in-Differences 
Estimates?, 119 Q.J. ECON. 249 (2004) (highlighting the problem of serial correlation in 
differences-in-differences estimations of causal relationships); see also Alberto Abadie, 
Semiparametric Difference-in-Differences Estimators, 72 REV. ECON. STUD. 1 (2005) (addressing 
some of the difficulties in the use of the difference-in-differences estimator to exclude variations 
created by serial correlation). 
133. See Berk, supra note 19, at 311 (finding that “most of the variation in homicides is simply 
a function of the average number of homicides in each state” and that the number of executions 
adds “virtually nothing” to the analysis); see also BADI H. BALTAGI, ECONOMETRIC ANALYSIS OF 
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One class of models designed for these circumstances is hierarchical 
regression models that generate growth curves or trajectories of change over 
time.  These regression models can identify the parameters that shape a pat-
tern or sequence of behaviors over time, also known as a trajectory or growth 
curve, and estimate the effects of interventions or treatments that might in-
fluence these patterns.134  The trajectories can be modeled using hierarchical 
or mixed effects estimation, in which some variables are considered fixed 
and others random.  Variables are analyzed as fixed effects when we assume 
that they are measured without error, or that they are constant across studies.  
So, for example, variables such as population, the number of executions or 
death sentences, or the incarcerated population are fixed effects.  In the sec-
ond set of models, then, variables are analyzed as random effects when we 
assume they have measurement error, or when we are making inferences or 
generalizations to some probability distribution. 
In this class of mixed effects growth curve models, the independent 
variables are modeled as fixed effects.  Time is modeled both as a fixed ef-
fect to control for the effects of specific years in the time series, and a ran-
dom effect, to estimate the rate of change over time in the dependent 
variable.  Of particular interest in this class of models is the interaction of 
time with each of the fixed effects.  This interaction allows the influence of a 
fixed effect to vary over time as the fixed effect itself changes.  Accordingly, 
the interactions show whether and how the rate of change in the dependent 
variable over time is affected by the values of the predictor or independent 
variable at different points in time.135 
 
PANEL DATA 84 (2001); Badi H. Baltagi & Qi Li, Testing AR(1) Against MA(1) Disturbances in an 
Error Component Model, 68 J. ECONOMETRICS 133 (1995); Robert C. Jung & A.R. Tremayne, 
Testing for Serial Dependence in Time Series Models of Counts, 24 J. TIME SERIES ANALYSIS 65 
(2003). 
134. See, e.g., STEPHEN W. RAUDENBUSH & ANTHONY S. BRYK, HIERARCHICAL LINEAR 
MODELS 163–202 (2d ed. 2002); JUDITH SINGER & JOHN B. WILLETT, APPLIED LONGITUDINAL 
DATA ANALYSIS: MODELING CHANGE AND EVENT OCCURRENCE 4 (2003); Sophia Rabe-Hesketh 
et al., Maximum Likelihood Estimates of Limited and Discrete Dependent Variable Models with 
Nested Random Effects, 128 J. ECONOMETRICS 301 (2005) (conducting simulation studies 
indicating that adaptive quadrature presents “unbiased estimates for random component probit 
models”). 
135. Panel data often are troubled by correlated error terms over time in the relationships 
between the dependent variables and the predictors.  To adjust for this problem, the models are 
estimated using AR(1) covariance structures. See generally SINGER & WILLETT, supra note 134. 
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The general model follows the form: 
Yij = γ00 + γ10TIME + γ01DETERRENCE + γ11(DETERRENCE* TIME) +  
γ02PUNISHMENT + γ12(PUNISHMENT * TIME)] + 
γ03OTHER_CRIME  + γ13(OTHER_CRIME * TIME)] + 
γ04DEMO_ECON + γ14(DEMO_ECON * TIME)] + 
[ζi0 + ζi1TIME + εij] 
where Yij is the rate of capital-eligible homicides (per 100,000 
population) in state i and year j, and DETERRENCE is a vector of variables 
including death sentences and executions.136  We use the natural log of the 
capital homicide rate.  The deterrence measures include separate contribu-
tions of executions lagged one year (year j-1), and a three-year moving 
average of death sentences prior to the current year in state i (years j-1, j-2, 
and j-3).137  We also test an alternate and simplified model with a binary 
measure of whether there is a valid death penalty statute in effect in the prior 
year.  PUNISHMENT is an alternate deterrence measure that indexes state 
prison incarceration to the felony crime rate.138  The cross-level interactions 
of each predictor with TIME identify whether the effects of TIME differ by 
levels of the theoretical predictors—i.e., whether executions, death sentences, 
or punishment variables are, in fact, associated over time with a decrease in 
homicide rates.  This is the critical test.139  We use two alternate measures of 
time, a linear time function and a quadratic time function that reflects the 
non-linear trends in homicides over time. 
The models include fixed effects for two crime patterns in the previous 
year.  First, we control for the natural log of the rate of noncapital-eligible 
homicides as an index of the general level of lethal violence.  Second, we 
include the natural log of the robbery complaint rate to control for the supply 
of events that might increase the supply of capital-eligible homicides.  Both 
the state and county models include covariates to control for socioeconomic 
factors140 that may influence both crime rates and the preferences of the 
 
136. We also included measures of homicide trends for 1968–1976 in state i and year j to 
control for longer term homicide trends within states.  However, Supplementary Homicide Report 
coding in this era did not include information on situations and circumstances to allow for 
classification of homicides as capital-eligible or noncapital-eligible. 
137. We assume that a three-year period for recall of death sentences is a reasonable reflection 
given the present orientation of criminal offenders, and specifically of homicide offenders.  See 
Fagan, supra note 19. 
138. In state-level models, PUNISHMENT is the lagged natural logarithm of the punishment 
index. In the county-level models for Texas, this variable represents the state prison population 
measure in the given year. 
139. See SINGER & WILLETT, supra note 134, at 3 (“Today we know it is possible to measure 
change, and to do it well, if you have longitudinal data . . . .”). 
140. In the state-level model, these factors include: the percent of the population in poverty, the 
Gini index of inequality, the percent of the population in the “peak crime age range” of 15–24, the 
percent of the population aged 65 or over, the logged population size, the percent of the population 
2006] Capital Punishment and Capital Murder 1839 
 
criminal justice system for more punitive criminal justice policies, especially 
incarceration,141 death sentences,142 and also the overproduction of death 
sentences that lead to high rates of reversible errors.143 
Prior studies using counties to estimate deterrent effects of the death 
penalty also ignore a second problem common to smaller spatial units: spatial 
autocorrelation, or spatial lag,144 where the murder rates in a particular 
county may also reflect processes that are taking place in the adjacent coun-
ties and may create noise in the estimates for a particular county.  The Texas 
county-level models thus also included a measure of spatial autocorrelation 
of time-lagged murder rates.  This strategy controls for general crime trends 
in neighboring counties, as well as over time.145 
We include two types of random effects: ζ0i, a random intercept, and ζ1i, 
a random effect of time.  The random intercept reflects the fact that while 
capital-eligible homicide rates are estimated to vary based on the effects of 
deterrence variables and other predictors, states and counties also differ on 
unobservable characteristics which might affect the starting points of each 
trajectory at the outset of the time series.  The random intercept provides the 
flexibility with which these differences can be modeled.  Likewise, a random 
effect for time generates estimates of the variance components attributable to 
 
living in urban areas, and the percent of the population that is black.  In the county model, the 
demographic and economic factors include the poverty rate and Gini index, the logged population 
size, and the percent of the population aged 15–24. 
141. See, e.g., David Jacobs & Jason T. Carmichael, The Politics of Punishment across Time 
and Space: A Pooled Time-Series Analysis of Imprisonment Rates, 80 SOC. FORCES 61 (2001) 
(showing that over a 60 year period, net of poverty and social disorganization, religious 
fundamentalism, political conservatism, and the rate of violent crimes, Republican strength and 
minority threat lead to higher imprisonment rates); David Jacobs & Ronald E. Helms, Toward a 
Political Model of Incarceration: A Time-Series Examination of Multiple Explanations For Prison 
Admission Rates, 102 AM. J. SOC. 323 (1996) (examining different economic and political factors to 
explain shifts in prison admissions since 1950). 
142. David Jacobs & Jason T. Carmichael, The Political Sociology of the Death Penalty: A 
Pooled Time-Series Analysis, 67 AM. SOC. REV. 109, 126–27 (2002) (showing that racial tipping 
points in the population and economic inequality are significant predictors of the adoption of death 
statutes in states following Furman and Gregg). 
143. See, e.g., LIEBMAN ET AL., supra note 126. 
144. Estimating the murder rate in a county without acknowledging what is going on next door 
may overstate the effect of a causal factor that is unique to that county.  In other words, the 
estimates of deterrence or any other causal factor may simply be picking up the effects of causal 
factors operating nearby but not necessarily within the county itself.  For a general discussion of 
spatial autocorrelation, see Edward Bullmore et al., In Praise of Tedious Permutation, in SPATIAL 
STATISTICS: METHODOLOGICAL ASPECTS AND APPLICATIONS 183, 190 (Marc Moore ed., 2001). 
145. Spatial lag measures were available only through 1999, and the models with the spatial lag 
parameter were artifactually truncated at 1997 due to the inclusion of measures that were lagged as 
much as three years.  The early termination of the time series could produce biased results that 
would change if later years were included.  Since the effects of spatial lag were not significant in 
this first set of models, we re-estimated the models excluding the spatial lag measures and report 
those results.  This strategy allowed us to include a larger number of years in the panel, including 
two years following the 1999 spike in executions in Texas. 
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differences in the state-specific or county-specific slopes of capital-eligible 
homicide trajectories.  All estimates are population-averaged, and an autore-
gressive (AR[1]) covariance structure is assumed.146 
While the state models use a linear estimation, the distribution of capital 
homicides in the county-level rates in Texas requires a different estimation 
method.  The capital homicide rates by county are skewed: 4,763 county-year 
observations out of 6,240 county-years have no capital-eligible homicides, 
the range is from zero to 213 capital homicides, and the standard deviation 
(8.9) is far higher than the mean (1.5).  Even with population-averaging, we 
still observe a nonlinear skewed distribution.  In circumstances such as this 
where the distribution is nonlinear and right-skewed, a Poisson distribution 
provides a more efficient and accurate method to estimate the mixed effects 
regression. 
Poisson techniques are appropriate to identify factors that predict the 
number of occurrences of an event within a specific observation period.147  
The Poisson distribution is a discrete distribution which takes on the values 
y = 0, 1, 2, 3, . . . .  Poisson distributions typically assume that events are 
inevitable, and that they follow some known distribution or frequency 
pattern.  It is often used as a model for the number of events (such as the 
number of telephone calls at a business or the number of accidents at an 
intersection) in a specific time period.  It is useful in studies of law and crime 
to model phenomena such as the number of crimes or the number of prison 
sentences.  The probability distribution for a Poisson process is defined as: 
.])[ˆr(Pˆ)r(Pˆ
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 The exact distribution depends on the expected rate of occurrence of the 
event of interest (y), and X is a vector of explanatory variables over time 
periods i.  When y is low, the distribution is skewed to the left.  When y is 
high, the distribution more closely resembles a normal distribution. 
The estimations for Texas, then, follow the same analytic plan, with 
county-year fixed effects estimations first followed by trajectory models 
using mixed effects regressions to address time trends and autoregression in 
homicide rates.  The Texas models differ in that we use the Poisson distribu-
tion to model the count of capital-eligible homicides instead of the linear 
 
146. See Baltagi & Li, supra note 133, at 139–43 (comparing MA(1) and AR(1) in an error 
component model). 
147. See, e.g., William Gardner et al., Regression Analyses of Counts and Rates: Poisson, 
Overdispersed Poisson, and Negative Binomial Models, 118 PSYCHOL. BULL. 392, 396 (1995) 
(explaining why Poisson regression is a more reasonable model for count data than a normal-errors 
linear regression model); Kenneth C. Land et al., A Comparison of Poisson, Negative Binomial, and 
Semiparametric Mixed Poisson Regression Models with Empirical Applications to Criminal 
Careers Data, 24 SOC. METHODS & RES. 387 (1996). 
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form that estimates the rates.148  We use an overdispersion correction149 to 
adjust the standard errors for the large number of zeros observations, and use 
the log of the county population as the exposure measure. 
C. Data and Measures150 
Specific variables and their data sources are described in Appendix B.  
Appendix C reports means and standard deviations for all variables.  
Homicide data were obtained from the Supplementary Homicide Reports, 
part of the FBI Uniform Crime Reports (UCR) archives.151  The UCR is a 
voluntary reporting system; data are compiled from police-agency reports 
submitted annually.152  Data on specific homicide events from 1976–2003 
were obtained from the Supplementary Homicide Reports (SHR), which in-
cludes incident-level data on offense, offenders, and victims.153  We used the 
situation and circumstance information in each record to categorize homi-
cides as capital-eligible or noncapital-eligible murders.  The classification 
method was described earlier in Part II, and was vetted against two databases 
of actual executions.154  While the SHR has varying patterns of missing data 
patterns that could produce nonclassical measurement error,155 the market-
 
148. We considered using a Zero-Inflated Poisson (ZIP) model, an alternate form of poisson 
regressions that are often used when there are excessive numbers of zero values.  See generally 
Diane Lambert, Zero-Inflated Poisson Regression, with an Application to Defects in Manufacturing, 
34 TECHNOMETRICS 1 (1992); Christopher J.W. Zorn, An Analytic and Empirical Examination of 
Zero-Inflated and Hurdle Poisson Specifications, 26 SOC. METHODS & RES. 368 (1998) (comparing 
the zero-inflated Poisson model to the hurdle event count model).  However, ZIP models may 
produce uninterpretable standard errors when the data are nested, as is the case here.  See Quang H. 
Vuong, Likelihood Ratio Tests for Model Selection and Non-nested Hypotheses, 57 ECONOMETRICA 
307 (1989). 
149.  See Gardner et al., supra note 147, at 397–99.  Overdispersion occurs when the observed 
variance of the data is larger than the predicted variance. Id. at 396.  A parameter, called the 
dispersion parameter, φ, is introduced to the model to lower this overdispersion effect, and is 
estimated as: 
∑
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Id. at 397. 
150. Data and statistical code for this study are from the authors at 
http://www2.law.columbia.edu/fagan/researchdata/caphom/. 
151. SHR, supra note 71. 
152. MALTZ, supra note 23, at 1. 
153. SHR, supra note 71.  Additional SHR data were obtained for the period 1968–1976, but 
these records did not include the types of detailed event information that would permit classification 
of each homicide as capital-eligible or noncapital-eligible.  Marc Riedel & Margaret Zahn, Trends 
in American Homicide, 1968–1978: Victim-Level Supplementary Homicide Reports (ICPSR Study 
No. 8676, 1994), available at http://webapp.icpsr.umich.edu/cocoon/ICPSR-STUDY/08676.xml. 
154. See supra subpart II(B). 
155. The participation of agencies within states in the UCR reporting system is not 
inconsistent.  As a result, it is difficult to tell whether failure to report any homicides in any month 
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share and disaggregation indicia are unlikely to be affected by random pat-
terns of counties within states failing to report their data.156 
Data for the deterrence measures were obtained from records of state 
trends in death sentences and executions maintained by the Death Penalty 
Information Center (DPIC)157 and the Bureau of Justice Statistics of the U.S. 
Department of Justice.158  The DPIC database includes all death sentences 
and executions from 1976 to 2003; no sampling was used or needed.  The 
deterrence vector includes measures of executions lagged one and two years, 
and death sentences lagged one, two, and three years.  We assume that 
rationality among would-be murderers is limited by their present orientation 
in estimating risk;159 accordingly, we limit the recall periods in which they 
identify events that might influence their subjective perceptions of execution 
 
means that the agency did not comply or that there were no murders that year to report.  See MALTZ, 
supra note 23, at 5; see also Fagan, supra note 19.  In both the state and county analyses, the annual 
counts of homicides in the SHR were compared to homicide reports in the UCR.  Observations in 
which the SHR underestimated the UCR by more than 25% were designated as outliers and dropped 
from the analysis. This results in the elimination of 185 of 1,300 observations in the state analysis 
and 105 of 6,076 in the Texas analysis. In the Texas analysis, where 1985 data were missing from 
the county UCR files and there was no basis for comparison with SHR files, a chi-squared test 
found no significant differences in the distribution of 1985 SHR county homicides compared to 
1983–1987 counts.  Accordingly, the 1985 SHR observations were retained in the analysis. 
156. The stable and nearly flat distribution of the capital-eligible homicide rates suggest that the 
addition of missing values within states would be unlikely to alter the observed rates of capital-
eligible homicides.  See, e.g., Stevenson & Wolfers, supra note 77, at 275 n.15. 
157. DPIC, Searchable Database, supra note 88. 
158. See Thomas P. Bonczar & Tracy L. Snell, Capital Punishment, 2002, BUREAU JUST. STAT. 
BULL., Nov. 2003, at 1–17, available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/cp02.pdf.  The data 
are publicly available at the National Archive of Criminal Justice Data, Institute for Social 
Research, University of Michigan.  See Bureau of Justice Statistics, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Capital 
Punishment in the United States, 1973–2002 (ICPSR Study No. 3958, 2004), available at 
http://webapp.icpsr.umich.edu/cocoon/ICPSR-STUDY/03958.xml. 
159. See, e.g., Charles Dean et al., Criminal Propensities, Discrete Groups of Offenders, and 
Persistence in Crime, 34 CRIMINOLOGY 547 (1996) (discussing various factors that effect a 
criminal’s low self-control in assessing present orientation, such as neuropsychological deficit, 
upbringing, moral beliefs, and geographical location); Sarah Lichtenstein et al., Judged Frequency 
of Lethal Events, 4 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL.: HUM. LEARNING & MEMORY 551, 574–77 (1978) 
(finding biases in the estimation of the frequency of lethal events due to “overestimation of [events 
with] low frequencies and underestimation of . . . [events with] high frequencies”); Yair Listokin, 
Future-Oriented Gang Members? Gang Finances and the Theory of Present-Oriented Criminals, 64 
AM. J. ECON. & SOC. 1073 (2005) (noting that many individual crime-propensity theories stem from 
the notion that “[a]s long as the gains from crime are immediate while the costs of crime are 
delayed, present-oriented individuals will commit crimes”); Daniel S. Nagin & Greg Pogarsky, 
Integrating Celerity, Impulsivity, and Extralegal Sanction Threats Into a Model of General 
Deterrence: Theory and Evidence, 39 CRIMINOLOGY 865 (2001) (formulating a metric that utilizes 
discounting to assess the effect of the celerity, severity, and certainty of punishment on a criminal 
individual’s decision-making process).  For a review on risk perception and deterrence, see Paul H. 
Robinson & John M. Darley, Does Criminal Law Deter? A Behavioral Scientist Investigation, 24 
OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 173 (2004), which reviews evidence from criminology and other 
behavioral sciences and concludes that the deterrent effects of the criminal law are quite limited. 
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risk.160  However, the lagged death sentence variables are highly correlated 
(r = .891), so we use instead a moving average of death sentences in the prior 
three years.  This variable is highly skewed, so we use the natural log of the 
moving average. 
Data on robbery complaints were obtained from the UCR archives that 
are maintained and published by the U.S. Department of Justice.161  County-
level data for Texas were obtained from the same sources.162 
The covariates include measures that are correlated with both murder 
and also with the use of the death penalty.  Following the measurement strat-
egy of Professor David Jacobs and Jason Carmichael,163 and a similar 
strategy used by Professor James Liebman and his colleagues,164 we include 
measures of the percentage of the population that is African American and 
the percentage of the population with incomes below the poverty line.  To 
further identify inequality, we use a Gini coefficient to measure inequality 
within each state and year.165  Other demographic controls include measures 
of the percentage of the population located in urban areas, since murder rates 
are higher in cities and other areas with higher population density.166  We 
also include a measure of the percentage of the population that is between 15 
and 24 years of age, because homicide rates were most volatile for this age 
group, especially during cyclical spikes in homicide rates.167  We use a meas-
ure of the ratio of persons aged 35 and older to persons under 15 as an index 
of supervision or social control.168  To control for the tendency of states to 
incarcerate noncapital homicide offenders, thereby deterring some murderers 
 
160. See, e.g., Chris Guthrie, Prospect Theory, Risk Preference, and the Law, 97 NW. U. L. 
REV. 1115, 1116–19 (2003) (explaining four different mechanisms by which people make risky 
decisions). 
161. See SHR, supra note 71. 
162. County-level crime reports were missing from the UCR in 1985.  Since our models use a 
one-year lagged measure of robbery reports as a predictor of capital homicide, the missing UCR 
data caused all 1986 data to be dropped from the county analysis. 
163. Jacobs & Carmichael, supra note 142, at 117. 
164. LIEBMAN ET AL., supra note 126, at 136–37, 144. 
165. The Gini coefficient is a measure of inequality of a distribution. It ranges between 0 and 1, 
where 0 corresponds to perfect equality (e.g. everyone has the same income) and 1 corresponds to 
perfect inequality (e.g. one person has all the income, and everyone else has zero income).  The Gini 
coefficient (G) is computed as: 
G=1-Σ fi(pi+pi-1) 
where: 
fi is the proportion of households in interval i 
pi is the proportion of total income received by recipients in interval i and all lower intervals. 
See, e.g., PAUL RYSCAVAGE, INCOME INEQUALITY IN AMERICA 38 (1999); Philip M. Dixon et al., 
Bootstrapping the Gini Coefficient of Inequality, 68 ECOLOGY 1548 (1987). 
166. Sampson & Lauritsen, supra note 54, at 54–55, 67–69. 
167. See Philip J. Cook & John H. Laub, The Unprecedented Epidemic of Youth Violence, 24 
CRIME & JUST. 27 (1998) (discussing the role of youth in violent crimes, particularly homicides). 
168. Sampson & Lauritsen, supra note 54, at 58. 
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from further acts of lethal violence, we include an interaction of the punish-
ment index with the noncapital homicide rate.  Finally, a dummy variable is 
included to control for the effects of the mass killing of 168 persons in the 
Oklahoma City federal building bombing in 1995. 
To estimate the punitive orientation of state criminal justice policies we 
include measures of punishment risk—defined as the number of state prison 
inmates per felony crime.  We lag this measure by one year and use its natu-
ral log due to skew across the states. 
Some studies use instrumental variables to resolve potential endogeneity 
in these relationships.  For example, Hashem Dezhbakhsh and his colleagues 
use indicators of partisan political influence and police and judicial expendi-
tures to sort out the relationship between population characteristics and crime 
rates, criminal justice policies, and use of the death penalty.169  However, 
these instruments are correlated not only with the existence of the death 
penalty in a state,170 but also with death sentences and executions,171 
incarceration rates,172 and because these indicia are more salient in death 
penalty states where murder rates are higher,173 with homicide rates.  The 
potential for biases are not insignificant and require attention.174 
The strategy for this analysis—random intercepts for capital homicide 
rates, fixed effects for states, lagged deterrence measures, and an 
autoregressive covariance structure—addresses a portion of the potential 
bias.  To further identify the selection biases in state preferences for the death 
penalty and its endogeneity with predictors of murder, we estimate selection 
effects by the presence of a death statute.  This parameter captures 
differences between death penalty and nondeath penalty states, controlling 
for factors correlated both with homicide and with the presence of a death 
statute.  To derive it, we estimate a logistic model using the overall murder 
rate, incarceration per felony crime, and the set of socioeconomic variables 
discussed earlier to predict the presence of a death penalty statute in each 
state-year.175  The selection model assigns a predicted “statute level” as each 
 
169. Hashem Dezhbakhsh et al., supra note 131, at 356–59.  Partisan political influence was 
measured as the Republican presidential candidate’s percentage of the vote in the most recent 
presidential election.  Id. at 357. 
170. See generally Jacobs & Carmichael, supra note 142. 
171. Id. at 121 tbl.2, 122 tbl.3; see also John Blume et al., Explaining Death Row’s Population 
and Racial Composition, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 165, 168 (2004). 
172. David Jacobs & Ronald Helms, Toward a Political Sociology of Punishment, Politics 
and Changes in the Incarcerated Population, 30 SOC. SCI. RES. 171, 182 (2001) (showing that 
each additional year of a Republican presidency increased the acceleration in the number of 
prisoners, in state prisons). 
173. Jacobs & Carmichael, supra note 142, at 119 tbl.1. 
174. See, e.g., Richard A. Berk, Knowing When to Fold ‘Em: An Essay on Evaluating the 
Impact of CEASEFIRE, COMPSTAT, and EXILE, 4 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 451 (2005). 
175. The variables used to predict “statute” are the overall murder rate, robbery rate, 
punishment index, percent aged 15–24, percent black, percent urban, poverty rate, and Gini 
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state’s propensity to have a death penalty statute in each year.  We use this 
parameter to estimate the effects of the presence of a death statute on capital-
eligible homicides, in effect controlling for a state’s decision to impose it.  
Next, we use this parameter in conjunction with the other deterrence 
variables to estimate the effects of the application of the death penalty. 
IV. Results 
A. State Analyses 
Tables 3 and 4 tell similar stories about the effects of death statutes, 
death sentences, and executions on capital-eligible homicides.  With different 
specifications and different functional forms in each table, there appears to 
be no evidence of deterrent effects of any component of capital punishment 
on the rates of capital-eligible homicides. 
Table 3 examines the effects of the presence of a death penalty statute, 
apart from its implementation, in each state-year.  Model 1 in Table 3 is a 
baseline model with only the punishment index and the rate of noncapital 
homicides (i.e., noncapital-eligible homicides) as predictors, with state and 
year fixed effects and a rich set of covariates relevant to state murder rates.  
In this functional form, there are no interactions with time; the coefficients 
instead show the average effect across states and years, controlling for time-
varying conditions within the states.  As expected, noncapital homicides 
exert a strong positive effect on the rate of capital-eligible homicides.  
Incarceration, as an alternate source of deterrence, is not a statistically 
significant predictor of capital homicides. 
 
coefficient—all measured contemporaneously in the outcome year.  The logistic model was 
estimated with fixed year effects reflecting nationwide punishment trends over our time horizon. 
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Table 3: Regressions of felony homicide rate by death penalty statute, 1978–
2002176 
 Fixed effects Trajectory 
Predictor Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Noncapital 
homicide rate .260*** .281*** .376*** .371*** .377*** 
 (.035) (.037) (.045) (.051) (.038) 
Statute  -.041  -.097 -.056 
  (.076)  (.088) (.060) 
.001 -.005 -.243*** -.225 -.201*** Punishment index 
(lagged, logged) (.026) (.027) (.038) (.043) (.029) 
 
Interactions with Time 
 
    
Noncapital 
homicide rate   -.012*** -.011*** -.001 
   (.004) (.004) (.0002) 
Statute    .012 .0003 
    (.009) (.0005) 
  .010*** .009** .0004 Punishment index 
(lagged, logged)   (.003) (.003) (.0002) 
State fixed effects      
Year fixed effects      
Covariates      
Random intercepts      
Time*Time      
      
BIC 14519 13904 -764.6 -710.9 -527.7 
N 1,017 973 1,017 973 973 
Significance: *** = p < .001, ** = p < .01, * = p < .05. 
The presence of a death penalty statute is assessed in Model 2, and the 
effect is not statistically significant.  Recall that we use a “predicted statute 
level” in lieu of the presence of the statute itself.177  This indicator reflects the 
propensity of states to have a death statute, based on differences between 
states in factors that are correlated with the presence of a death statute: the 
homicide and robbery rates, population composition, and inequality.  In 
 
176. In Models 3–5, predictors for each year were nested within states, thereby controlling for 
each state’s unique effects over time. 
177. See supra note 175 and accompanying text. 
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effect, it is an indicator of whether a state has the death penalty in a given 
year, controlling for its propensity to enact it. 
The results in Model 2 show that presence of a death statute does not 
predict differences in state-years in the rate of capital-eligible homicides.  
The parameter estimate is small, not statistically significant, and induces no 
changes in the other estimates.  Its only effect is to slightly reduce the stan-
dard errors of the other parameters in the model.  Noncapital homicide rates 
remain the strongest predictor of capital homicides.  Comparing the fit 
estimates (BIC) in Models 1 and 2, Model 2 improves the fit slightly 
compared to Model 1 without the statute effect. 
In Model 3, we introduce the effects of time, and estimate the changes 
in the effects of each predictor over time.  This model analyzes capital-
eligible homicide rates as a trajectory in each state and identifies the effects 
of the predictors in explaining the differences in trajectories in states with 
and without the death penalty.  Again, we use year fixed effects to account 
for national trends in homicides.  In lieu of state fixed effects, however, here 
we use random intercepts to account for different starting points in each state 
and random effects for time that effectively nests each time trend within a 
specific state trajectory.  Predictors are nested within states in this model 
form, creating a specification that addresses each state’s unique effects be-
yond what the covariates can capture.  We also include the same set of 
covariates as in Models 1 and 2.  Readers unfamiliar with these estimation 
techniques should read the upper portion of Models 3–5 in the same way as 
the state-year fixed effects results in Models 1 and 2: these are the average 
effects over time, but before considering the effects of trajectories through 
time.178  To identify whether the over-time trajectories of capital-eligible 
homicide rates differ in death and nondeath penalty states and to identify 
whether statutes explain the differences, readers should focus on the lower 
portion of the table: the interactions of each predictor with time show the ef-
fects of each predictor on the rate of capital homicides over time.  In this 
model form, changes in the rate of change or trajectory of a dependent 
variable are estimated from the interaction of time with each independent 
variable.179 
Similar to Model 1, Model 3 shows baseline estimates without the 
deterrence predictor.  The lower portion of Model 3 shows that noncapital 
homicide rates are significant negative predictors of the capital homicide 
rate.  Punishment is not significant through time.  The effect for noncapital 
homicides on capital homicides illustrates the market share phenomenon: as 
 
178. The coefficients for noncapital homicides are greater in the trajectory models in the upper 
portion of the table than in the fixed effects analysis in Models 1 and 2, in part because of the 
explicit treatment of time in the covariance matrix. 
179. SINGER & WILLETT, supra note 134, at 4. 
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the rate of noncapital homicides declines, it takes an increasingly large share 
of the homicide “market.” 
Model 4 shows that the effects of death penalty statutes are not 
significant, but even with this putative deterrent effect included in the 
estimate, the market share of capital homicides still increases over time as 
noncapital rates fall.  The size and significance of the coefficient for 
noncapital homicide rates are unchanged.  Again, there is a modest 
improvement in model fit.  Punishment again is significant. 
Model 5 repeats Model 4, adding a quadratic time trend to the linear 
time trend.  This nonlinear time trend generates more restrictive tests of tra-
jectories that include even small, temporary nonlinear trends within longer 
time trends that appear invariant.  The results are virtually unchanged from 
Model 4.  Again, the significant negative coefficient for the noncapital homi-
cide rate suggests that the market share of homicides that are capital-eligible 
increases over time, even in the presence of a death penalty statute. 
Next, we turn to the effects of the components of deterrence that are 
specific to the death penalty: executions and homicides.  In Models 2, 4, and 
5 in Table 4, we again include the predicted statute measure, an indicator of 
each state’s propensity to have the death penalty.  We add measures of the 
specific components of deterrence as indicators of the “dosage” of capital 
punishment in each state.  Obviously, these values are set to zero for non-
death states.  By including the predicted statute indicator together with the 
deterrence components, we include a measure of the deterrent threat from 
having the death penalty “on the books” even in states where it is rarely or 
never used. 
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Table 4: Regressions of felony homicide rate by deterrence and punishment, 
all states, 1978–2002180 
 Fixed effects Trajectory 
Predictor Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Noncapital homicide rate .260*** .290*** .376*** .356*** .377*** 
 (.035) (.039) (.045) (.050) (.039) 
Statute  -.040  .048 -.093 
  (.077)  (.083) (.063) 
Executions (lag 1)  .003***  -.002 -.001 
  (.001)  (.009) (.006) 
Executions (lag 2)  -.001  -.008 -.012 
  (.002)  (.010) (.006) 
 -.001  -.018 .007 Death sentence (3 yr 
moving average)  (.001)  (.010) (.008) 
.002 -.011 -.242*** -.289*** -.193*** Punishment index (lagged, 
logged) (.026) (.028) (.038) (.042) (.031) 
 
Interactions with time 
 
     
Noncapital homicide rate   -.012*** -.008*** -.0006*** 
   (.004) (.004) (.0002) 
Statute    .002 .0004 
    (.008) (.0004) 
Executions (lag 1)    .0002 .000 
    (.0005) (.000) 
Executions (lag 2)    .0003 .000 
    (.0005) (.000) 
   -.001 .000 Death sentence (3 yr 
moving average)    (.001) (.000) 
  .010*** .012*** .0004*** Punishment index (lagged, 
logged)   (.003) (.003) (.0002) 
State fixed effects      
Year fixed effects      
Covariates      
Random intercepts      
Time*Time      
      
BIC 14520 13933 -764.6 -670.6 -454.2 
N 1,017 973 1,017 973 973 
Significance: *** = p < .001, ** = p < .01, * = p < .05. 
 
180. In Models 3–5, predictors for each year were nested within states, thereby controlling for 
each state’s unique effects over time. 
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The first two models in Table 4 show results of fixed effects 
regressions, and the last three models show results of trajectory analyses.  
Model 1 repeats Model 1 from Table 3—with state and year fixed effects, a 
rich set of covariates, and a fixed effect for incarceration risks (punishment). 
In Model 2, we add three components of deterrence: executions in the 
state lagged one and two years, and the log of the three-year moving average 
of death sentences in the state.  We use moving averages because of the 
strong collinearity among the three separate lagged death sentence counts for 
the three prior years.  The results are virtually unchanged from Model 2 in 
Table 3: there are no deterrent effects from any of the components of 
deterrence.  The coefficients for the deterrence components are small and not 
statistically significant.  The rate of noncapital homicides remains the 
strongest predictor, averaged over time, of the capital homicide rate. 
The trajectory analyses in Models 3–5 lead to the same conclusions as 
the fixed effects analyses.  Model 3 is a baseline trajectory model with only 
the punishment index and the noncapital homicide rate included as 
predictors.  This model repeats Model 3 from Table 3, illustrating the strong 
influence of noncapital homicide rates on capital homicide rates averaged 
across time and the increasing “market share” of homicides that are capital 
homicides.  Model 4 introduces the deterrence components, with time as a 
linear function.  Model 5 again specifies time as a quadratic term. 
The results replicate the pattern for the trajectory analyses shown in 
Table 3.  We see once again the absence of deterrent effects from either the 
presence of a death statute or any of the components of deterrence.181  The 
parameter estimates in the lower portion of Table 4 for each of the compo-
nents of the death penalty are low, and they are not statistically significant.  
Similar to the results in Table 3, the significant negative estimate for 
noncapital homicides suggests that “market share” of homicides that are 
capital-eligible is growing even as the noncapital rate falls. 
 
181. There is one weak positive effect in Model 5, but in the overall pattern of nonsignificance, 
this may be a chance result lacking validation in other specifications. 
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Figure 5: Capital-eligible homicide rates, adjusted for deterrence 
components, noncapital homicide rates, punishment risk and covariates, by 
executions lagged 1 and 2 years 
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We illustrate the results for Model 4 in Table 4 graphically in Figure 5.  
The graph shows a Lowess-smoothed function of the relationship between 
capital-eligible homicide rates and executions lagged one and two years, 
along with upper and lower bounds of the 95% confidence interval.  The up-
per portion of Figure 5 shows the relationship of executions per state-year 
lagged by one year to the rate of capital-eligible homicides in death penalty 
states only, adjusted for the effects of the death penalty components, 
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incarceration risks, and the socioeconomic  and criminal justice covariates 
that were included in each of the regression models in Table 4.  The lower 
portion of Figure 5 shows the relationship of the same adjusted rates of 
capital-eligible homicides to executions lagged by two years.  The figures 
also include upper and lower 95% confidence intervals. 
Both figures show the clustering of observations near zero for 
executions, a reflection of the scarcity of executions.  The overall flatness of 
the curves—even at the extremes of execution frequency—is striking.  Any 
variation from year to year occurs by chance, and the overall picture is one of 
no effect of the components of the death penalty on capital homicide rates.  
As executions increase to approximately 18 in any year, the homicide rate 
rises slightly.  (Such high levels are exclusive to Texas.)  The homicide rate 
declines slightly for the next two observations before flattening out for the 
remainder, which are widely spaced.  In both figures, the lines are flat, and 
the results in Table 4 suggest that any deviation from a zero slope is simply 
chance within the confidence intervals. 
Robustness checks are embedded in Tables 3 and 4, and include 
estimations with alternate functional forms and with alternate measures of 
the death penalty.  First and most important, we estimated models using con-
ventional fixed effects regression methods for panel data, with state and year 
factors modeled as fixed effects in a pooled, cross-sectional analysis.  The 
alternative, a trajectory or growth curve analysis, estimates changes in slopes 
through time between groups and identifies factors that contribute to slope 
differences after controlling for random intercepts that represent different 
starting points for each state observation.182  Each set of models was esti-
mated with an alternate explanation for deterrence through incarceration risk.  
The models include a rich set of covariates that assesses the effects of factors 
that also may influence the homicide rate.  Second, the results were stable 
using two operational definitions of the death penalty and two conceptuali-
zations of deterrence.  The convergence of results in Tables 3 and 4, with 
models that use different functional forms and specifications, provides strong 
evidence of the robustness of the empirical estimates. 
We also estimated the same sets of models using only the rate of felony 
murders (logged) as the dependent variable.  Felony murder is the most 
prevalent form of capital-eligible homicide, accounting for more than half the 
capital-eligible homicides nationwide and also in Texas.  The results were 
unchanged: there were no significant effects for the deterrence variables.183  
Once again, the noncapital homicide rate is the strongest predictor of felony 
 
182. See supra note 134 and accompanying text. 
183. Data and tables are available from the authors at 
http://www2.law.columbia.edu/fagan/researchdata/caphom/. 
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murders, showing the growing market share of homicides that are capital-
eligible. 
While these internal comparisons are important tests, the apparent 
inelasticity of capital homicides over time and across states suggests that 
there is simply not all that much variance to explain in these multivariate 
models.  Certainly, the overall homicide rate varies extensively over time and 
between states, as well as between death penalty states.  This is the basis of 
nearly all deterrence tests over the past decade.184  But the rate of capital-
eligible homicides varies little over time or between states.  And, the scarcity 
of executions in most states except Texas, also leaves little variance left to be 
explained by the “right hand side” of these equations.  So, while robustness 
tests are critical in the face of difficult empirical estimations, the task here is 
simpler and less vulnerable to misspecification.   
B. Capital Homicide and Deterrence in Texas 
There are three differences in the analysis for Texas compared to the 
state-analyses.  First, the models are estimated with a Poisson distribution of 
the count of capital-eligible homicides, with the counts scaled to the 
population of each of the 254 counties in the state.  The sparseness of capital 
homicides in most counties in most years required this approach.  The result 
was a high incidence of rates of zero or very low rates in most counties.  The 
simple fact of low rates and near invariance over time complicated the 
regression analyses that were based on linear models that assumed normal 
distributions.  Even log transformations, which would impose a less skewed 
structure on the data, did not create conditions amenable to the same type of 
analysis that we used for the state models.  Accordingly, we use 
overdispersed Poisson regression models with fixed effects for the deterrence 
measures and random intercepts and random slopes to more efficiently 
estimate trends of murders through time. 
Second, only statewide measures of death sentences and punishment 
risks (state prison populations) were available.  County-level information 
was not available for the entire time period of interest in this analysis.  We 
include the state-level predictor; however, as a statewide constant, it varies 
by year but not by county within years.185  Execution data were available by 
 
184. See supra notes 9–16, 129 and accompanying text. 
185. None of the options to address this limitation were acceptable.  All solutions required an 
estimation method to allocate inmates to counties as a function of population and crime rates.  
However, the empirical literature on criminal sentencing suggests that there are unobservable 
factors in states and local courts that shape sentencing practices and produce disparities by crime 
type, race, and other population characteristics.  Any allocation formula would be unable to 
measure, much less identify statistically, the sources of these disparities, many of which lie in local 
politics and local legal cultures.  See, e.g., EISENSTEIN & JACOB, supra note 110; MARTHA A. 
MYERS & SUSETTE M. TALARICO, THE SOCIAL CONTEXTS OF CRIMINAL SENTENCING 1 (1987) 
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county and year.  Since the analysis focuses on a single state with the death 
penalty, we include estimates only of the deterrent effects of the components 
of capital punishment.  Texas had its first death sentence in 1977 and its first 
execution in 1982.  Because of limitations in county-level data in Texas, the 
study period is 1978–2001.186  Third, Models 3-5 include a dummy variable 
for Harris County, to capture the unique effects of the concentration of Texas 
executions in, that county.187 
The models in Table 5 show no evidence of deterrent effects of capital 
punishment on the incidence of capital-eligible homicides in Texas counties.  
Neither death sentences nor executions are significant in any of the three 
models that test these effects in conjunction with other county- or state-level 
factors.  The signs for the parameter estimates of executions at times are 
positive and other times are negative, a sign of instability in the estimates 
given the tight temporal spacing of the time lags.  The parameter estimates 
for the statewide death sentence rates also are small and not statistically 
significant. 
 
(exploring the “linkages between the social order and criminal sentencing” by “[f]ocusing on the 
county, court, and temporal contexts”). 
186. Models were estimated with and without Moran’s I statistic for spatial autocorrelation in 
total homicide rate with adjacent Texas counties. The results with and without the spatial measures 
were identical, and the measure of spatial lag was not significant in any of the models. Texas 
counties are large areas, and it is not surprising that the parameters for spatial lag were not 
statistically significant. Accordingly, we report here the results without the spatial measures. 
187. The dummy variable is included only in Tables 3–5.  In the fixed effects regressions in 
Models 1 and 2, Harris County effects are captured as part of the fixed effects estimation. 
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Table 5: Poisson regressions of capital-eligible homicide rate by deterrence 
and punishment, Texas, 1978–2001188 
 Fixed effects Trajectory 
Predictor Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
.0007* .001** .002*** .002*** .002*** Noncapital homicide 
rate (.0003) (.0004) (.0004) (.0005) (.0004) 
 .013  .054 .044 Executions (lag 1)  (.009)  (.051) (.033) 
 .002  -.013 -.005 Executions (lag 2)  (.009)  (.053) (.032) 
 -.015  -.016 -.018 Death sentence (3 yr 
moving average)  (.024)  (.011) (.007) 
-.099 -.021 .149 .049 -.0002 Punishment index 
(lagged, logged) (.112) (.186) (.077) (.086) (.049) 
 
Interactions with time 
 
 
  .000 .000 .000 Noncapital homicide 
rate   (.000) (.000) (.000) 
   -.002 .000 Executions (lag 1)    (.003) (.000) 
   .001 .000 Executions (lag 2)    (.003) (.000) 
   -.0003 .000 Death sentence (3 yr 
moving average)    (.001) (.000) 
  -.014** -.006 -.0002 Punishment index 
(lagged, logged)   (.005) (.006) (.0002) 
County fixed effects      
Year fixed effects      
Covariates      
Random intercepts      
Time*Time      
      
BIC 10929 10951 26878 26995 27050 
N 5,458 5,456 5,458 5,456 5,456 
Significance: *** = p < .001, ** = p < .01, * = p < .05. 
 
188. In Models 3–5, measures for each year were nested within counties, thereby controlling for 
each county’s unique effects over time. 
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Figure 6 illustrates graphically the results of Table 5, Model 4.  Figure 6 
plots the predicted number of capital homicides in each Texas county-year as 
a function of executions in the county in the previous year and the previous 
two years.  The graph shows a Lowess-smoothed function of the bivariate 
relationship, along with upper and lower bounds of the 95% confidence 
interval.  As in Figure 5, the upper portion of Figure 6 shows the relationship 
of executions per county-year lagged by one year to the incidence of capital-
eligible homicides, adjusted for the effects of the death penalty components, 
incarceration risks, and the socioeconomic covariates that were included in 
each of the regression models in Table 5.  The lower portion of Figure 6 
shows the relationship of the same adjusted incidence of capital-eligible 
homicides to executions lagged by two years.  The figures also include upper 
and lower 95% confidence intervals. 
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Figure 6: Capital-eligible homicide counts in Texas counties, adjusted for 
deterrence components, noncapital homicide counts, punishment risk and 
covariates, by executions lagged 1 and 2 years 
0
50
10
0
15
0
20
0
C
ap
ita
l h
om
ic
id
e 
co
un
t (
ad
ju
st
ed
)
0 2 4 6 8 10
Executions (1 yr lag)
95% CI: lower bound 95% CI: upper bound
Capital homicide count (adjusted) Capital homicide count (adjusted)
 
0
50
10
0
15
0
20
0
C
ap
ita
l h
om
ic
id
e 
co
un
t (
ad
ju
st
ed
)
0 2 4 6 8 10
Executions (2 yr lag)
95% CI: lower bound 95% CI: upper bound
Capital homicide count (adjusted) Capital homicide count (adjusted)
 
As before, both figures show the clustering of observations near zero for 
executions, a reflection of the scarcity of executions.  The sparseness of exe-
cutions and capital homicides produces a set of data points that are heavily 
clustered around zero.  The rise in the slope over time is simply by chance, 
and is not a sign of a “brutalization” effect of capital punishment. 
1858 Texas Law Review [Vol. 84:1803 
 
The narrow confidence intervals result from the relative sparseness of 
executions and the extreme right-skew of the distribution of capital-eligible 
homicides across a large dataset with nearly 5,000 observations.  There were 
0 capital-eligible homicides in 3,346 county-years, and another 422 have 
only 1.  A few (3%) have more than 7 capital homicides, ranging widely 
from 7 to 213 executions.  Predicted homicide counts based on our models 
are similarly skewed.  Most (75%) observations are predicted to have less 
than 0.563 capital homicides, and 95% are predicted to have fewer than four.  
This distribution, heavily concentrated around low homicide counties, pro-
vides low standard errors of prediction, leading to narrow confidence 
intervals.  The standard errors for the predicted capital homicide counts are 
quite narrow under these conditions, as seen in the tight confidence intervals 
around the predicted homicide counts. 
Similar to the state-level analyses, we also estimated the same set of 
models using only the rate of felony murders (logged) as the dependent 
variable.  The pattern of results were unchanged compared to Table 5: there 
were no significant effects for the deterrence variables.189  As before, the 
noncapital homicide rate is the strongest predictor of felony murders, again 
showing the growing market share of homicides that are capital-eligible. 
As in the national data, the inelasticity of capital homicides in Texas 
leaves little variance to explain, and also little room for leverage or influence 
by capital punishment.  The relatively low incidence of capital homicides is 
unaffected by sparse executions when disaggregated across 254 counties, 
each with its own murder rate and unique conditions that shape the 
differences between places and changes in homicide trajectories over time.  
Expectations of capital punishment to influence capital homicides under 
these conditions simply are unrealistic.190 
 
189. Data and tables are available from the authors at 
http://www2.law.columbia.edu/fagan/researchdata/caphom/. 
190. One important influence omitted from this analysis is the effect of drug markets on 
homicides.  See, e.g., Eric Baumer et al., The Influence of Crack Cocaine on Robbery, Burglary, 
and Homicide Rates: A Cross-City, Longitudinal Analysis, 35 J. RES. CRIME & DELINQ. 316 (1998) 
(analyzing the effect of crack cocaine on trends in burglary, robbery, and homicide); Daniel Cork, 
Examining Space–Time Interaction in City-Level Homicide Data: Crack Markets and the Diffusion 
of Guns Among Youth, 15 J. QUANTITATIVE CRIMINOLOGY 379 (1999) (examining the connection 
between the expansion of the use of crack cocaine and the growth in homicide rates); see also 
Roland G. Fryer Jr. et al., Measuring the Impact of Crack Cocaine (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, 
Working Paper No. W11318, 2005), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=720405. Markets usually 
are measured, however imperfectly, by drug arrest rates. See Richard Rosenfeld & Scott H. Decker, 
Are Arrest Statistics a Valid Measure of Illicit Drug Use? The Relationship Between Criminal 
Justice and Public Health Indicators of Cocaine, Heroin, and Marijuana Use, 16 JUST. Q. 685 
(1999) (examining “alternative indicators” of illicit drug use besides drug arrests).  However, data 
on drug arrests for Texas and the nation were unavailable systematically before 1985, and the 
coverage in the UCR databases is inconsistent.  Moreover, homicides in drug transactions—other 
than so-called “drug kingpin” murders—rarely qualify as death-eligible under the statutes either in 
Texas or across the nation. Although federal law explicitly authorizes the death penalty for some 
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V. Conclusion 
All of the recent studies claiming a relationship between death penalty 
policy and homicide rates suffer from an important and avoidable 
aggregation error: they examine the relationship between death penalty 
variables and total non-negligent homicide rates, despite the fact that 
three-fourths of all such killings do not meet the statutory criteria to be 
eligible for the death penalty.  This study isolated the quarter of all killings 
that might qualify for death and used trends in these killings to test for mar-
ginal deterrent impact of death penalty policy.  By using the FBI’s 
Supplementary Homicide Reports, we isolated the fewer than 25% of re-
ported killings that include 95% of all cases that produce executions in the 
United States.  Almost all of the cases in this group are potentially eligible 
for the death penalty if convicted.  For the other 75% of all homicides, fewer 
than 2% of all killings have any potential exposure to capital punishment. 
Once these two types of killings have been separated, a natural method 
of testing the influence of the death penalty is to look for distinctive 
variations in the death-eligible killings that are consistent with marginal 
execution risk deterrence.  Since the risk of an execution is more than fifty 
times greater in a death penalty state for the “death-eligible” cases, the varia-
tions in these cases but not the others should produce the distinctive 
fingerprints of death penalty policy deterrence, both over time and cross-
sectionally. 
But none of the distinctive patterns one might expect from marginal 
death penalty deterrence can be found in the nearly three decades since 
Gregg.  Where the risk of execution goes up in a death penalty state, the 
death-eligible cases where that risk should make a difference do not decline 
more than the non-eligible cases, nor is the proportion of all homicides that 
risk a capital sanction in death states any smaller in those states than it is in 
states without any death penalty.  An effective death penalty would produce 
changes in this category of homicides: the market share of all homicide that 
are death-eligible should decline in the face of the threat of execution.  But 
that is not the case. 
In fact, the incidence of death-eligible cases in those states is 
remarkably stable over time, insensitive to variations in the incidence of 
 
“drug kingpins” under the 1988 Drug Kingpin Act, Pub. L. No. 100-690, § 7001, 102 Stat. 4181, 
4387 (1988) (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 848 (2000 & Supp. 2006)), such laws are rarely 
used by the states. Prior to the expansion of the federal death penalty in 1994, six persons were 
sentenced to death in federal courts under this drug kingpin statute.  Death Penalty Info. Ctr., The 
Federal Death Penalty, http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/article.php?scid=29&did=147.  Our 
analysis of the 100 most recent executions in state courts and the 50 most recent cases in Texas did 
not include anyone convicted under drug kingpin statutes, nor were any lower-level drug dealers 
identified in this exercise.  Accordingly, while drug markets are considerable in the overall 
homicide rate, their omission from this analysis is inconsequential. 
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executions or to the large swings from one decade to the next in the number 
or rate of nondeath-eligible killings.  Even in Texas, the leading execution 
state by far in the nation, the proportion of death-eligible killings is no 
smaller than in other categories of states, and there is no differential decline 
in death-eligible killings as the execution rate increased in the 1980s and 
1990s.  The marginal deterrent threat of executions on trends in these 
homicides would be plainly visible if it existed.  This lack of effect obtains 
when simple comparisons are made over time and cross-sectionally, and the 
same pattern of non-effect persists when models to account for other 
influences on homicide are added.  There is simply no visible evidence of the 
marginal deterrent impact of the death penalty on death-eligible killings. 
There is an odd and rather sad irony in the persistent failure of modern 
deterrence arguments to classify homicides by execution eligibility.  In the 
earlier era of less complex statistical comparisons, Thorsten Sellin tested the 
impact of death penalty policy on specific types of killings like those of po-
lice officers.191  At that time, the detailed classification by death eligibility of 
most reported killings was not possible.  The legal changes that made the 
classifications used in this study possible were produced by the United States 
Supreme Court cases of Furman192 and Gregg193 and the pattern of state stat-
ute these cases required.  So the capacity to control for death eligibility 
increased after the 1970s, but the modern studies that proclaimed their statis-
tical sophistication in citing strong deterrent effects from the death penalty 
failed to distinguish between death-eligible and non-eligible cases. 
Our search for death penalty deterrence where it should be a strong 
influence on homicide rates has produced consistent results: the marginal 
deterrent effect of the threat or example of execution on those cases at risk 
for such punishment is invisible. 
 
191. See SELLIN, supra note 25, at 52–59.  Sellin’s classic studies of more than fifty years ago 
included particularly high risk categories of homicides, such as killings of police officers and prison 
guards.  See Thorsten Sellin, The Death Penalty and Police Safety, in CAPITAL PUNISHMENT, supra 
note 124, at 138, 152 (finding little difference between the murder rates of police officers in death 
penalty states and abolition states); Thorsten Sellin, Prison Homicides, in CAPITAL PUNISHMENT, 
supra note 124, at 154, 159 (finding that the threat of the death penalty had no effect in deterring 
prison violence). 
192. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972). 
193. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976). 
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Appendix A: A partial list of studies published after 1990 on the deterrent 
effects of the death penalty 
Harold J. Brumm & Dale O. Cloninger, Perceived Risk of Punishment 
and the Commission of Homicides: A Covariance Structure Analysis, 31 J. 
ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 1 (1996). 
Dale O. Cloninger, Capital Punishment and Deterrence: A Portfolio 
Approach, 24 APPLIED ECON. 645 (1992) 
Dale O. Cloninger & Roberto Marchesini, Execution and Deterrence: A 
Quasi-Controlled Group Experiment, 33 APPLIED ECON. 569 (2001). 
Dale O. Cloninger & Roberto Marchesini, Execution Moratoriums, 
Commutations and Deterrence: The Case of Illinois, 38 APPLIED ECON. 967 
(2006). 
Hashem Dezhbakhsh et al., Does Capital Punishment Have a Deterrent 
Effect? New Evidence from Postmoratorium Panel Data, 5 AM. L. & ECON. 
REV. 344 (2003). 
Hashem Dezhbakhsh & Joanna M. Shepherd, The Deterrent Effect of 
Capital Punishment: Evidence from a “Judicial Experiment,” 44 ECON. 
INQUIRY 512 (2006). 
Lawrence Katz et al., Prison Conditions, Capital Punishment, and 
Deterrence, 5 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 318 (2003). 
Zhiqiang Liu, Capital Punishment and the Deterrence Hypothesis: 
Some New Insights and Empirical Evidence, 30 E. ECON. J. 237 (2004). 
H. Naci Mocan & R. Kaj Gittings, Getting Off Death Row: Commuted 
Sentences and the Deterrent Effect of Capital Punishment, 46 J.L. & ECON. 
453 (2003). 
Joanna Shepherd, Deterrence Versus Brutalization: Capital 
Punishment’s Differing Impacts Among States, 104 MICH. L. REV. 203 
(2005). 
Joanna M. Shepherd, Murders of Passion, Execution Delays, and the 
Deterrence of Capital Punishment, 33 J. LEGAL STUD. 283 (2004). 
Jon Sorensen et al., Capital Punishment and Deterrence: Examining the 
Effect of Executions on Murder in Texas, 45 CRIME & DELINQ. 481 (1999). 
James A. Yunker, A New Statistical Analysis of Capital Punishment 
Incorporating U.S. Postmoratorium Data, 82 SOC. SCI. Q. 297 (2002). 
Paul R. Zimmerman, Estimates of the Deterrent Effect of Alternative 
Execution Methods in the United States: 1978–2000, 65 AM. J. ECON. & 
SOC. (forthcoming 2006). 
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Paul R. Zimmerman, State Executions, Deterrence, and the Incidence of 
Murder, 7 J. APPLIED ECON. 163 (2004). 
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Appendix B: Data domains and sources 
Domain Source 
Homicide rates and 
characteristics 
 State and county homicide totals are taken from 
Uniform Crime Reports [United States]: Supplementary 
Homicide Reports, 1976–2003 (ICPSR Study No. 4351, 
2005), available at 
http://webapp.icpsr.umich.edu/cocoon/ICPSR-
STUDY/04351.xml.  The Supplementary Homicide 
Reports were filtered to exclude the deaths in New York 
associated with the attacks of September 11, 2001, but 
include those associated with the Oklahoma City bombing 
of April 19, 1995. 
 Homicides in the following SHR categories were 
designated potentially capital murders: killings committed 
during crimes (rape, robbery, burglary, larceny, arson, car 
theft), multiple-victims killings, killings of persons 
younger than 6 years old, “gangland” homicides, sniper 
killings, killings of police officers, and institution killings.  
Homicides committed by offenders less than sixteen years 
old were excluded from the “potentially capital” pool. 
Supplementary Homicide Reports were compared to the 
aggregated Uniform Crime Reports at both the state-year 
and county-year levels to identify undercounts in the SHR 
data.  State-years and county-years when observations 
undercounted the UCR homicide totals by at least 25% 
were excluded from the analysis.  The final sample 
included 1,115 state-years of data, and 5,991 county-years 
of data. 
Execution counts and statute 
information 
 State execution data and dates of death penalty 
reinstatement were compiled from the execution database 
of the Death Penalty Information Center (DPIC), 
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/executions.php.  County 
execution data for Texas were obtained from the Texas 
Department of Criminal Justice, 
http://www.tdcj.state.tx.us/stat/executedoffenders.htm.  
Executions in Texas were assigned to counties based on 
the offender’s county of conviction. 
Death sentence counts  Bureau of Justice Statistics, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 
Capital Punishment in the United States, 1973–2002 
(ICPSR Study No. 3958, 2004), available at 
http://webapp.icpsr.umich.edu/cocoon/ICPSR-
STUDY/03958.xml. 
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Law Enforcement Officers 
Killed and Assaulted 
(LEOKA) 
 The LEOKA data is available from the Inter-
University Consortium for Political and Social Research, 
in the following reports: Fed. Bureau of Investigation, U.S. 
Dep’t of Justice, Uniform Crime Reporting Program Data 
[United States]: Police Employee (LEOKA) Data, 2003 
(ICPSR Study No. 4269, 2005), available at 
http://webapp.icpsr.umich.edu/cocoon/NACJD-
DAS/04269.xml; Fed. Bureau of Investigation, U.S. Dep’t 
of Justice, Uniform Crime Reporting Program Data 
[United States]: Police Employee (LEOKA) Data, 2002 
(ICPSR Study No. 3996, 2004), available at 
http://webapp.icpsr.umich.edu/cocoon/ICPSR-
STUDY/03996.xml; Fed. Bureau of Investigation, U.S. 
Dep’t of Justice, Uniform Crime Reporting Program Data 
[United States]: Police Employee (LEOKA) Data, 2001 
(ICPSR Study No. 3749, 2002), available at 
http://webapp.icpsr.umich.edu/cocoon/ICPSR-
STUDY/03749.xml; Fed. Bureau of Investigation, U.S. 
Dep’t of Justice, Uniform Crime Reporting Program Data 
[United States]: Police Employee (LEOKA) Data, 2000 
(ICPSR Study No. 3445, 2002), available at 
http://webapp.icpsr.umich.edu/cocoon/ICPSR-
STUDY/03445.xml; Fed. Bureau of Investigation, U.S. 
Dep’t of Justice, Uniform Crime Reporting Program Data 
[United States]: Police Employee (LEOKA) Data, 1999 
(ICPSR Study No. 3165, 2001), available at 
http://webapp.icpsr.umich.edu/cocoon/ICPSR-
STUDY/03165.xml; Fed. Bureau of Investigation, U.S. 
Dep’t of Justice, Uniform Crime Reporting Program Data 
[United States]: Police Employee (LEOKA) Data, 1998 
(ICPSR Study No. 2907, 2001), available at 
http://webapp.icpsr.umich.edu/cocoon/ICPSR-
STUDY/02907.xml; Fed. Bureau of Investigation, U.S. 
Dep’t of Justice, Uniform Crime Reporting Program Data 
[United States]: 1975–1997 (ICPSR Study No. 9028, 
2005), available at 
http://webapp.icpsr.umich.edu/cocoon/ICPSR-
STUDY/09028.xml. 
Drug arrests  State data on drug arrests 1985–2003 are aggregated 
from annual files of county-level crimes and arrests, 
Uniform Crime Reporting Program Data [United States]: 
County-Level Detailed Arrest and Offense Data (various 
years), available from University of Michigan, Inter-
University Consortium for Political and Social Research, 
http://www.icpsr.umich.edu/.  
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Social and economic 
characteristics 
 State population, socioeconomic, age structure and 
racial composition data from 1970 to 2000 were obtained 
from the U.S. Bureau of the Census, Population Estimate 
Archives, http://www.census.gov/popest/archives/.  Age 
structure data for 2000–2003 were obtained from the 
United States Census Bureau, Population Estimates by 
State, http://www.census.gov/popest/states/asrh/SC-
est2004-02.html.  State population and racial composition 
data are taken from the United States Census Bureau, 
Population Estimate Archives, 
http://www.census.gov/popest/archives/.  Projections for 
intra-census years in the 1970s, 1980s, and 2000s were 
obtained from by the Bureau of the Census.  Bureau of the 
Census, Intercensal County Estimates by Age, Sex, Race: 
1970–1979, http://www.census.gov/popest/archives/pre-
1980/co-asr-7079.html; Bureau of the Census, Intercensal 
Estimates of the Resident Population of States and 
Counties 1980–1989, 
http://www.census.gov/popest/archives/1980s/e8089co.txt; 
Bureau of the Census, 1990 to 1999 Annual Time Series of 
County Population Estimates by Age, Sex, Race, and 
Hispanic Origin, 
http://www.census.gov/popest/archives/1990s/CO-99-
12.html; Bureau of the Census, 2000s, 
http://www.census.gov/popest/archives/2000s/.  Census 
indicia for the decade 1990–2000 census were 
interpolated. 
 Urbanization.  Annual estimates of the percentage of 
state population residing in urban areas were obtained 
from the U.S. Census Bureau, Census of the Population 
1990 and 2000, http://factfinder.census.gov.  Mid-census 
data points were linearly interpolated.  For 1988 and 1989, 
the percentage of the population in urban areas was taken 
from the Statistical Abstracts of the United States. 
 Poverty.  The percentage of each state’s population 
with incomes below the poverty line was taken from the 
Census Bureau’s annual poverty estimates, available at 
http://factfinder.census.gov (last visited Jan. 11, 2005). 
 Inequality.  State-level Gini coefficients were taken 
from the Census Bureau’s “families” estimates for 1969, 
1979, 1989, and 1999, available at 
http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/income/histinc/state/stat
e4.html.  Intervening years were linearly interpolated.  
Gini family estimates were used instead of household 
estimates since the latter were unavailable for 1969.  In 
comparisons of Gini family estimates with Gini household 
estimates for the 1979-99 period, the household estimates 
generally were higher than the family estimates by no 
more than five percentage points for any of the 
measurement points, and they had parallel trends over 
time.  County-level Gini coefficients for Texas also were 
taken from the U.S. Census Bureau and linearly 
interpolated for intra-census years.   
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Punishment   State-level punishment indices are computed as the 
ratio of the number of inmates incarcerated in the state in 
the relevant year per 100 FBI Index Crimes committed in 
the state in that year.  Annual state prison population data 
are taken from the National Corrections Reporting 
Program.  Data are from electronic spreadsheets available 
from Bureau of Justice Statistics Spreadsheets—Crime & 
Justice Electronic Data Abstracts, 
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/dtdata.htm#prisoners.  Data 
from 1999–2003 are taken from the See BUREAU OF 
JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, SOURCEBOOK 
OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS—2003 (Ann L. Pastore 
& Kathleen Maguire eds., 2004), available at 
http://www.albany.edu/sourcebook. 
Robbery rates  State-level robbery rates also were recorded from the 
county-level FBI Uniform Crime Reports, 1970–2005.  
County-level robbery complaints for Texas were recorded 
from the FBI Uniform Crime Reports, 1978–2001 (data for 
1985 were missing). 
Spatial statistics  Spatially lagged homicide rates were computed for 
Texas counties based on Uniform Crime Report county 
homicide counts for each year.  Counties were designated 
as “neighboring” if they shared a border.  We computed a 
Moran’s I, a weighted correlation coefficient used to detect 
departures from spatial randomness.  Departures from 
randomness indicate spatial patterns, such as clusters.  The 
statistic may identify other kinds of pattern such as 
geographic trend, including a lagged effect.  The spatial 
lag was computed as the correlation of county homicide 
rates with the average murder rate in surrounding counties.  
See LUC ANSELIN, GEODA 0.95I RELEASE NOTES (2004); 
Luc Anselin et al., GeoDa: An Introduction to Spatial 
Data Analysis, 38 GEOGRAPHICAL ANALYSIS 5 (2006). 
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Appendix C: Means and standard deviations of key outcomes and predictors, 
1978–2003194 
 All states 
Death 
penalty 
states 
Nondeath 
penalty 
states 
Texas 
Harris 
County 
Capital-
eligible 
homicide rate 
1.47 
(0.85) 
1.62 
(0.85) 
1.16 
(0.78) 
2.31 
(0.60) 
4.36 
(1.41) 
Noncapital 
homicide rate 
4.90 
(2.76) 
5.46 
(2.70) 
3.73 
(2.50) 
8.81 
(2.97) 
13.61 
(5.25) 
Executions 
0.72 
(2.97) 
0.98 
(3.52) 
0.18 
(1.00) 
12.52 
(12.81) 
2.90 
(3.02) 
Population 
5,299,200 
(5,647,348) 
5,981,996 
(6,114,259) 
3,884,099 
(4,196,685) 
17,585,917 
(2,314,260) 
2,874,008 
(299,058) 
Robbery 
complaint rate 
(state-level) 
147.1 
(104.5) 
159.6 
(92.3) 
121.1 
(122.3) 
198.5 
(40.0) 
55.7 
(13.3)195 
Poverty rate 
12.7% 
(3.8) 
13.3% 
(3.9) 
11.7% 
(3.2) 
16.4% 
(1.3) 
14.1% 
(1.9) 
% black 
9.5% 
(8.5) 
11.7% 
(9.2) 
4.9% 
(4.4) 
11.7% 
(.2) 
19.5% 
(.2) 
Ln 
(punishment 
index) 
(lagged, state-
level) 
1.49 
(0.64) 
1.60 
(0.59) 
1.25 
(0.66) 
1.76 
(0.67) 
 
Inmate count 
(TX counties 
only) 
    
78,103 
(51,030) 
% age 15–24 
15.8% 
(2.1) 
15.7% 
(2.1) 
16.0% 
(2.1) 
16.3% 
(1.7) 
16.1% 
(1.8) 
Gini 
coefficient 
.39 
(.03) 
.40 
(.03) 
.38 
(.02) 
.43 
(.02) 
.43 
(.06) 
N 1,017 686 331 5,991 20 
 
 
194. “Outlier” states and counties, in which the SHR murder count undercounts the UCR by 
more than 25%, are omitted.  Counties missing one or more of the predictors are also omitted, 
leaving N observations. 
195. Robbery complaints for Harris County are county-specific reports.  Texas county panel is 
1978–1998. 
